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Articles 
CYBER COMMODIFICATION 
MIRIAM A. CHERRY∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Last year, the Huffington Post blog found itself involved in a con-
tentious legal dispute with its unpaid bloggers about the commodifi-
cation of its content.1  The Huffington Post features many posts that are 
straight-ahead news reports;2 other posts have featured more ideolog-
ical content aimed at a liberal audience.3  Leading up to the 2008 
                                                        
Copyright © 2013 by Miriam A. Cherry. 
∗ Professor of Law, Saint Louis University Law School; J.D., 1999, Harvard Law School, 
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 1.  Paul Farhi, Unpaid Bloggers Plan to Sue HuffPo, AOL, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2011, 
11:38 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-buzz/post/unpaid-bloggers-plan-
to-sue-huffpo-aol/2011/04/12/AFFSlZQD_blog.html. 
 2.  See, e.g., Daniel Bukszpan, The Most Expensive NFL Tickets of the Season: CNBC, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09 
/09/most-expensive-nfl-tickets_n_1865589.html?utm_hp_ref=business (noting the top 
NFL tickets in terms of price). 
 3.  See Tim Rutten, AOL? HuffPo. The Loser? Journalism, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at 15, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/09/opinion/la-oe-rutten-column-huff 
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election, many Huffington Post bloggers wrote accounts critical of then-
President George W. Bush, specifically his administration’s treatment 
of the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, while others wrote to assist fellow 
Democratic voters become more familiar with the primary candi-
dates.4  Regardless of one’s personal political leanings, the website at-
tracted a sophisticated level of writing in its posts: Featured bloggers 
included professional journalists and attorneys who contributed their 
efforts to the Huffington Post for free, despite normally being paid for 
their writing.5  Freshly updated content helped attract an additional 
audience to the blog, which grew rapidly, reaching fifteen million hits 
per weekday.6 
In March 2011, media giant AOL submitted a $315 million acqui-
sition bid for the Huffington Post.7  The HuffPo website, and the traffic 
driven to that site, was valuable to AOL, a company that had been 
searching for more content providers and an expanded audience for 
existing content.8  Arianna Huffington and her financial backers 
                                                        
ington-aol-20110209 (stating that the Huffington Post tailors its content to its “overwhelm-
ingly liberal audience”). 
 4. See, e.g., Shayana Kadidal, Guantanamo, Six Years Later, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 
2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/guantanamo-six-years-late_b_810 
25.html (criticizing the Bush administration on its operation of Guantanamo Bay).  For 
the Huffington Post’s current stance on this issue, see Ben Fox, Guantanamo Closure Hopes 
Fade as Prison Turns 10, HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 10, 2012, 4:21 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/10/guantanamo-closure-anniversary_n_1195 
984.html. 
 5.  See Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 56–61, Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 734 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 2472(JGK)), 2011 WL 1366476 (alleging that the Huffington 
Post recruited professional journalists and authors to generate high quality content without 
compensation). 
 6.  See Nate Silver, The Economics of Blogging and the Huffington Post, N.Y. TIMES  (Feb. 
12, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/the-
economics-of-blogging-and-the-huffington-post/ (estimating fifteen million page hits per 
weekday on HuffPo and analyzing the types of posts and attention the site was typically at-
tracting).  
 7.  Id.; see also Julianne Pepitone, Huffington Post Blogger Sues AOL for $105 Million, 
CNN MONEY (Apr. 12, 2011, 2:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/12/technology/ 
huffington_post_blogger_lawsuit/index.htm (noting that AOL had acquired Huffington 
Post for $315 million). 
 8.  See Jeremy W. Peters & Verne G. Kopytoff, Betting on News, AOL is Acquiring Huff-
ington Post, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011, at A1 (describing AOL’s reasons for purchasing the 
Huffington Post, including its desire for more news content and a broader audience). 
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stood to make a handsome profit from the acquisition.9  The blog-
gers, on the other hand, who had built the blog’s readership by dint 
of their hard work, were to receive nothing.10  Frustrated, Jonathan 
Tasini, a journalist and labor activist,11 along with other unpaid blog-
gers, filed a lawsuit challenging the terms of the deal.12  The bloggers 
claimed that their hard work had built the blog’s value, entitling them 
to a share of the profits by virtue of a contract claim or a claim for un-
just enrichment and restitution.13 
The heart of the Huffington Post bloggers’ claims seemed to rest, 
as many contract-related disputes do, in the differing expectations 
that the parties brought with them to the deal.  From the bloggers’ 
perspective, they performed work without payment because they be-
lieved that they were contributing to a political website that advanced 
the causes in which they believed.14  Retroactively, the bloggers 
learned that the site’s founders were to profit from the blog, and they 
therefore felt exploited.15  The Huffington Post contended that the 
bloggers undertook their writing with no expectation of compensa-
tion.16  Further, they claimed that the bloggers did receive a substan-
                                                        
 9.  See id. (“The sale means a huge payout for Huffington Post investors and holders of 
its stock and options . . . .”). 
 10.  See Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 3 (alleging that none of the profits 
from AOL’s purchase of the Huffington Post were shared with its bloggers); see also Rutten, 
supra note 6 (“To grasp its business model . . . you need to picture a galley rowed by slaves 
and commanded by pirates.”).  
 11.  Jonathan Tasini was previously the successful lead plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging 
the rights of newspapers to license the work of freelance writers to electronic databases 
without additional compensation.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001). 
 12.  Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 3.  
 13.  Id. at ¶ 2.  The claim would be that, although a formal contract was lacking, the 
organizers of the Huffington Post were unjustly enriched and a restitution theory would be 
applied to compensate the bloggers.  Ashby Jones, Do Huffington Post Bloggers Deserve to Get 
Paid?, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Apr. 12, 2011, 4:01 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/04/12/should-huffington-post-bloggers-get-paid/. 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
 15.  The unpaid bloggers posted on the Twitter account #huffpuff, claiming that Huff-
Po “‘built a blog-empire on the backs of thousands of citizen journalists.’”  Silver, supra 
note 6.  Ironically, liberal ideology generally tends to support organized labor and work-
ers’ rights. 
 16.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
the First Amended Complaint at 1, Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 734 (S.D.N.Y 2011) 
(No. 11 Civ. 2472(JGK)), 2011 WL 8198300. 
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tial benefit, as they used the HuffPo “to connect and help their work 
be seen by as many people as possible.  It’s the same reason people go 
on TV shows: to promote their views and ideas.”17  In other words, ac-
cording to the HuffPo, the blog provided unknown writers with an 
important boon: a platform for expression and free publicity to a 
growing audience.18  On March 30, 2012, the district court sided with 
the HuffPo blog and dismissed the bloggers’ complaint.19  The deci-
sion was later affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit.20 
While the Huffington Post dispute is a new context for examining 
the monetization of Internet websites and online activities, the fact is 
that this question—whether a website is or should be commercial-
ized—is becoming an increasingly common and vexing one.  For the 
past decade, technology has fundamentally shaped and restructured 
the ways in which many markets function.21  Indeed, certain goods 
and services, which in the past were off-limits because they would have 
been impracticable to sell or difficult to buy, have been brought to 
                                                        
 17.  Jeremy W. Peters, Huffington Post Is Target of Suit on Behalf of Bloggers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 12, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12 
/huffington-post-is-target-of-suit-on-behalf-of-bloggers/. 
 18.  Id.  For academic commentary discussing the rise of amateurism and peer produc-
tion of blogs, see John Quiggen & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 203, 220 (2008). 
 19.  Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 734, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, No. 12–1428–
CV, 2012 WL 6176559, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2012). 
 20.  Tasini v. AOL, Inc., No. 12–1428–CV, 2012 WL 6176559, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 
2012).  
 21.  For example, computerized trades have replaced the loud, frantic atmosphere of 
the “trading pit” where stockbrokers traditionally executed buy-sell orders.  See Graham 
Bowley, The New Speed of Money, Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, at BU1 (noting 
that most stock trading in the United States is conducted via computer); Michael J. De La 
Merced & Jack Ewing, A German Bid to Take over the Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at 
A1 (“[I]ncreasingly trades are being executed by computers far from Wall Street.”); see also 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 5 J.L. & COM. 509, 509 (1996) (noting, 
presciently, that “the way we think about property is changing in light of the technological 
and social realities of the global flow of digital information over linked computer net-
works”); M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology 
Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 850–52 (2010) (describing psychological literature 
on how humans are interacting with robotic devices, such as global mapping programs 
and Roomba housekeepers). 
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market by intermediaries such as eBay,22 Amazon.com,23 and 
craigslist,24 as these platforms25 have either minimized or removed var-
ious transaction costs.26  Further, items that have traditionally been 
seen as non-monetizable, such as predictions about future events,27 
                                                        
 22.  EBAY, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).  As one of the first online 
auction websites, eBay has certainly had its share of commodification controversies.  In 
1999, the attempted auction of a human kidney on eBay created a furor and spurred fur-
ther debate surrounding markets in human organs.  Amy Harmon, Auction for a Kidney 
Pops up on eBay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13.  Citing federal law criminalizing or-
gan sales, eBay removed the auction but not before bids had reached several million dol-
lars.  See id. (noting that the National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006), crim-
inalizes the sale of human organs).  Since that time, eBay has attracted more than its share 
of nontraditional sale items, including “holy toast,” a grilled cheese sandwich with a grill 
pattern that reflected the likeness of the Virgin Mary, occult items, and even people put-
ting themselves up for sale. $28,000 Bid Wins Sandwich, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2004, at C18; 
Mary Ann Georgantopoulos, Student’s eBay Stint Pays the Bills, Makes a Friend, BOS. GLOBE, 
Aug. 12, 2007, at 4 (describing a vacationing student who sold himself—or at least one 
week of his labor—to pay for an airline ticket back to the United States).  Which goods 
and services are considered legitimately for sale, which are jokes, and which are banned is 
a seemingly delicate and ever-shifting line implicating issues of public policy, morality, and 
the doctrines of common law contracts.  As new markets form and transaction costs con-
tinue to fall, the boundaries between market and non-market activity are prone to in-
creased slippage.  So while it is legally acceptable for one to sell the space on one’s fore-
head to sport a tattoo with the name of a corporation, the literal sale of one’s soul is 
forbidden on Internet auction sites.  Compare, Andrew Adam Newman, The Body as Bill-
board: Your Ad Here, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at B3 (noting the legal business of tattoo 
advertising), with Soul Seller, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2004, at 49 (describing auction for a soul 
that slipped past eBay’s rules; the price of a soul in that auction was a mere $400). 
 23.  AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
 24.  CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
 25.  I use this term throughout the article even though it has many meanings, includ-
ing a technical platform, a platform from which to speak, or, in the words of one commen-
tator, platforms as the “curators of public discourse.”  See Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of 
‘Platforms’, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y (2010) (discussing the use of the term “platform”); Niva 
Elkin-Koren, User-Generated Platforms, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1648465 (discussing social media platforms). 
 26.  See infra Part II.B. 
 27.  See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY (Yale Univ. Press 2008) (de-
scribing the benefits of prediction markets).  For the author’s discussion prediction mar-
kets, see generally Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First 
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tasks performed in minutes or even seconds of leisure time,28 or the 
friendship and connections that comprise social capital,29 are all now 
rapidly in the process of being valued, monetized, globalized,30 and 
marketed online.  At times these shifting boundaries have resulted in 
legal disputes.31 
When it comes to commodification on the Internet, it is a wild, 
wild World Wide Web.  Researching encyclopedia articles for Wikipe-
dia is an unpaid labor of love, but connecting to your friends on Fa-
cebook is a $100 billion enterprise.32  Newspaper classified advertise-
ments are definitely commercial, but their equivalent on craigslist was 
mostly non-commercial—until the Delaware Chancery Court stepped 
in.33  Selling your organs is prohibited in the United States, whereas 
selling hair promises to rescue third-world citizens from poverty.34  
Selling sex is illegal as prostitution, but selling adultery online is a hot 
new business model.35  And a small company offering a free service to 
academics has quietly become the dominant method for disseminat-
ing academic legal research, beating massive commercial data provid-
ers without anyone initially noticing.36  This Article will explore these 
and other recent developments to explore the challenging legal issues 
raised by Internet commodification of what is often unpaid labor. 
The new technology that has given rise to these unconventional 
markets raises provocative legal and theoretical questions.  Funda-
                                                        
Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (2008) [hereinafter Cherry & Rogers, Prediction Mar-
kets] (discussing the legal issues surrounding prediction markets); Miriam A. Cherry & 
Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information Markets to Predict Supreme Court 
Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2006) (discussing the application of prediction markets 
to Supreme Court decisions); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Markets for Markets: 
Origins and Subjects of Information Markets, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (2006) (analyzing the 
history and evolution of prediction markets). 
 28.  Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at 5. 
 29.  See infra Part III.B. 
 30.  See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 471, 472–73 (2010) [hereinafter Cherry, Virtual Work] (noting the increasing trend 
toward globalization in online work). 
 31.  See infra Part IV. 
 32.  See infra Part III.B. 
 33.  See infra Part III.A. 
 34.  See infra Part I. 
 35.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 36.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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mental questions remain as productive collaborative uses of the In-
ternet continue to develop: How will the lines between monetized and 
free goods and services be drawn in cyberspace?  How will technology 
be used to shape or change existing norms about what is and what is 
not commodified?  As new technologies are created, disputes arise 
about how and when marketization could or should occur.37  On one 
hand, money can attract participation in ways that purely fun activities 
might not be able to, and it can provide important incentives for en-
gaging users.38  On the other hand, the Internet has as part of its 
ethos an “open access” ethic39 that has led to many useful free innova-
tions, with examples that are as wide-ranging as the development of 
Linux to free mapping programs and Wikipedia.40 
It is often difficult to analyze change when it is unfolding and 
one is living through it.  Much of our current body of contract law 
doctrine traces its origins to the rise of mass production and expan-
sion of factory labor 300 years ago.41  The changes in information 
technology and commerce that are now taking place are equally as 
complex and dramatic as the innovations during the original Indus-
trial Revolution.42  Accompanying advances in communication and in-
formation technology is a dramatic expansion of online trade and 
                                                        
 37.  See infra Part IV. 
 38.  See infra Part II. 
 39.  See, e.g., GOOGLE MAPS, http://www.googlemaps.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2012); 
MAPQUEST, http://www.mapquest.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
 40.  WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
 41.  For example, the doctrine on the foreseeability of contract damages comes to us 
from the case Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.), 9 Ex. 341.  Richard 
Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 249, 
253 (1975).  As noted by Professor Danzig, the case was part of a sea change in commerce 
that came along with the advent of mass production.  Id. at 250–51. 
 42.  One contemporary of the English Industrial Revolution wrote the following in de-
scribing the changes and the effect that had on the law of commerce:  
What our Law was then [before the Industrial Revolution], it is not now; and 
what is now, can best be understood by seeing what it was, then.  It is like the 
comparison between England under former, and present, systems of transit, for 
persons, property, and intelligence: between the days of lumbering waggons, 
stage coaches, and a creeping post—and of swift, luxurious Railroads, and light-
ening Telegraphs.  All is altered: material, inducing corresponding social and 
moral changes.   
SAMUEL WARREN, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW STUDIES AND TO 
EVERY DEPARTMENT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 12 (3d ed. 1863).  
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commerce.43  As such, it is important to think of contract law’s place 
in this new world of networked trade and commerce.44  This Article 
will identify current developments and analyze what types of legal is-
sues these developments may pose for the future.  Some well-
established doctrines of contract law may help in resolving disputes in 
this diverse wild-web world.45 
This Article will make a unique contribution to the theoretical 
work surrounding commodification.46  In The Wealth of Networks, Pro-
fessor Yochai Benkler extols the virtues of free collaboration in cyber-
space, via what he describes as open-source or “commons-based peer 
production.”47  Professor Margaret Radin also expresses skepticism 
about markets in relation to unconventional markets.48  On a first ex-
amination, choices about commodification seem binary—an on or off 
switch—and as such they are in fundamental tension.49  With a deeper 
examination, however, I believe this is a false dichotomy.50  Commodi-
fication is more of a continuum, with many portions of the Internet 
existing in states of what Professor Radin might term “incomplete 
commodification.”51  While Professors Benkler and Radin are skepti-
                                                        
 43.  See supra Part II. 
 44.  See infra Part V.A. 
 45.  See infra Part V.A. 
 46.  See infra Part V.B. 
 47.  See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 9 (2006) (“As collaboration 
among far-flung individuals becomes more common, the idea of doing things that require 
cooperation with others becomes much more attainable, and the range of projects indi-
viduals can choose as their own therefore qualitatively increases.  The very fluidity and low 
commitment required of any given cooperative relationship increases the range and diver-
sity of cooperative relations people can enter, and therefore of collaborative projects they 
can conceive of as open to them.”); see also Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai 
Benkler and the Nature of Peer Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963, 969–78 (2009) 
(discussing, inter alia, Benkler’s theory of peer production). 
 48.  See infra Part V.B. 
 49.  See infra Part V.B. 
 50.  See infra Part V.B. 
 51.  Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1917–20 
(1987); see also Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodifi-
cation, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 8, 25 n.16 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams 
eds., 2005) (noting that Radin is “convinced that [her] most useful scholarly contribution 
is likely to be having made the word ‘commodification’ speakable in legal academic dis-
course”).  Indeed, as early as 2002, Professor Radin, a pioneer of commodification theory 
in legal literature, noted that the Internet and other computer technology was helping to 
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cal of marketization of the Internet, that skepticism is, in my view, 
mostly unjustified.52  There is nothing about the Internet that inher-
ently means that it must be free.  In fact, it is my contention that con-
tests and disputes arise not because of commodification itself but be-
cause of misunderstandings about the degree of commodification 
surrounding a particular transaction.53  With the appropriate qualifi-
cations and limits that will be pointed out throughout the Article, 
monetization need not be as problematic as these two scholars seem 
to assume.54 
Keeping this thesis in mind, while scholars have provided narrow 
telescopic glimpses into isolated components of cyber commodifica-
tion, this piece will aim to catalogue and describe these issues further.  
At the outset, I note that cyber commodification is a multivalent con-
cept that does not lend itself to easy analysis or description.  The term 
cyber commodification as I employ it refers to a number of ideas, in-
cluding creating new markets for goods or services on the Internet 
that have not existed before; monetizing items that we would not 
normally think of as financial concepts, such as friendship, or two 
seconds of someone’s time, or someone’s individual predictions about 
the future; creating business models that attempt to harness what 
would traditionally be unpaid labor and what commentators have re-
ferred to as “peer production”; or leveraging or arbitraging the differ-
ing values of goods or services based on the absence of geographic 
boundaries on the Internet.  As this is a complex and new phenome-
non, the rest of this Article will seek to provide a rough exploratory 
map of this new terrain. 
This Article will proceed in five parts and will use both illustrative 
examples and broader theoretical material to map the concept of 
cyber commodification more fully.  Part I will explain how cyber 
commodification is different from earlier forms of commodification 
that are more familiar to us.  As such, it will seek insights from the 
first wave of commodification theory, which grew out of advances in 
medical technology and enabled us to think about reproduction, or-
gan sales, and other biologic components associated with the body in 
                                                        
accelerate various types of commodification by lowering transaction costs and bringing 
buyers and sellers together in a truly global marketplace.  Margaret Jane Radin, Incomplete 
Commodification in the Computerized World, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 3, 4 
(Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002).  
 52.  See infra Part V.B. 
 53.  See infra Part V.B. 
 54.  See infra Part V.B. 
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market terms.  From this more historical and theoretical background, 
Part II will discuss the forces that have propelled cyber commodifica-
tion.  These forces include anonymity, the elimination of geograph-
ical barriers, and the lack of jurisdictional guidelines that apply to the 
Internet.  While the examples in this Part range all the way from an 
online market for adultery to Chinese “goldfarmers” who play video 
game characters for a living, what they share is that they explain why 
the cyber commodification phenomenon has become ubiquitous.  
Part III will discuss the process of cyber commodification, using the 
business model of craigslist as an illustrative example, and will exam-
ine prediction markets, which monetize knowledge and information.  
Part IV will move on to contests and disputes that have arisen from dif-
fering expectations that parties bring with them into various transac-
tions.  Finally Part V will explore the greater implications of cyber 
commodification, including its various associated costs and benefits. 
I.  DIFFERENTIATING CYBER COMMODIFICATION 
Scholars have studied and analyzed the commodification of 
goods and services with a great deal of attention, focusing on non-
traditional or controversial markets, such as markets in surrogacy or 
the sale of organs or body parts.  Some of these unconventional cate-
gories push the boundaries of what most in our society would consid-
er off-limits or problematic.  In the literature, unconventional markets 
are thus often referred to as taboo trades,55 “repugnant markets,”56 or, 
humorously, “ick-onomics.”57  While these matters have been at least 
partially analyzed by courts and academic commentators, the markets 
between monetized and non-monetized transactions are still being 
clarified.58  Indeed, it is important to realize that these delineations 
are often contextually and culturally dependent.59  For example, pay-
                                                        
 55.  Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 40 (2007) 
(quoting Alan P. Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions that 
Transgress Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 255–97 (1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 56.  Id. at 39–42.  
 57.  Josephine Marcotty, Kidney Failure, Part 3: A Revolution: Trading Donors, STAR TRIB., 
Sept. 29, 2009, at 1A. 
 58.  See Roth, supra note 55, at 44–45 (discussing some of the uncertainties surround-
ing monetary and nonmonetary transactions). 
 59.  See id. at 42–44 (describing how transactions can be judged differently in different 
contexts and cultures). 
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ment for organs is forbidden in the United States but is permitted in 
Iran;60 markets in fossils are outlawed in many European countries but 
they thrive in the lightly regulated market of the United States.61 
So, what can we learn from these examples for our present pur-
poses of exploring cyber commodification?  Further, what are the dif-
ferences between these offline commodification concerns and what is 
happening now online?  Specifically, how have markets responded to 
previous technological changes?  How did the law play a role in the 
creation or inhibition of the markets?  
A.  Existing Legal Framework for Regulation of New Markets 
As a broad overview, U.S. federal and state laws police the border 
of marketable goods and services.  On the first order are constitution-
al provisions, such as the Thirteenth Amendment,62 and statutes that 
criminalize, forbid, or otherwise ban markets in a particular good or 
service.  These provisions are sometimes dependent on context, and 
may shift over time along with the changing morals of the day.  In ad-
dition, many statutes set the ground rules for participation in markets 
or attempt to protect vulnerable participants, although these statutes 
are more about regulation than forbidding particular market activi-
ty.63  Finally, other common law doctrines, such as public policy, con-
sideration, and the concept of inalienability in property law operate 
within common law to establish the line between permissible market 
versus nonmarket activity.64 
                                                        
 60.  Alex Tabarrok, The Meat Market, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, at A1; Claire Suddath & 
Alex Altman, How Does Kidney-Trafficking Work?, TIME (July 27, 2009), http://www.time. 
com/time/health/article/0,8599,1912880,00.html. 
 61.  See Miriam A. Cherry, A Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named “Sue”: Using a Disputed Dino-
saur to Teach Contract Defenses, 81 N.D. L. REV. 295, 295–97 (2005) (describing lightly regu-
lated fossil markets in the United States). 
 62.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (banning the institution of slavery); Mario L. Barnes & 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 
1067 (2011). 
 63.  See Joel Seligman, The Changing Nature of Federal Regulation, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
205, 207–10 (2001) (discussing statutes enacted to create a national system of securities 
regulation).  
 64.  See Radin, supra note 51, at 1855–59 (discussing the concept of inalienability). 
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Constitutional provisions or criminal statutes can put certain ac-
tivities off-limits for exchange in a market.65  Constitutional provisions 
can be used to outlaw a market for a good entirely, which was the case 
with the prohibition of alcohol.66  Criminal statutes may also be writ-
ten in such a way that make an entire market illegal; or it may be con-
text dependent.  For example, many drugs that once were legal, such 
as cocaine, are now banned.67  But other banned drugs, specifically 
marijuana, are permissible with the presence of particular medical 
conditions in certain states.68  Sexual activity, which would otherwise 
be legal, is criminalized if it involves the exchange of money.69  And 
                                                        
 65.  See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Offenses: As Criminal Laws Prolif-
erate, More Ensnared, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A1 (describing a father and son who were 
arrested for digging arrowheads on federal land). 
 66.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (instituting prohibition along with the Volstead Act), 
repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the 
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 1 (2004) (discussing the impact on the shipment of wine as a result of the Twenty-
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars—Direct Ship-
ment of Wine: The Twenty-First Amendment, The Commerce Clause, and Consumers’ Rights, 38 AM. 
BUS. L. J. 1 (2000) (same). 
 67.  See, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness 
of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1310–13 (describing the criminalization of cocaine in 
the United States).  
 68.  See, e.g., Michael Berkey, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 
9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 417, 428–31 (2011).  
 69.  Andrew Gilden, Sexual (Re)consideration: Adult Entertainment Contracts and the Problem 
of Enforceability, 97 GEO. L.J. 541, 553 (2007). Anti-prostitution laws criminalize the pay-
ment of money for sexual services.  This rule, however, is also context-dependent and pro-
duces odd results in its application at times.  While payment for sexual services is banned 
in prostitution, producers of pornography legally pay performers for their appearance in 
sexually explicit films, which include payment for sexual services.  See Taylor v. State, 808 
P.2d 314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (introducing this legal distinction).  Recently, Professor 
SpearIt has argued that the justification for the distinction between prostitution and por-
nography is a flimsy one, since both constitute the commodification of sexual services.  As 
such, the criminalization of prostitution treats those in like situations unequally, in fact 
criminalizing the activity for those of lower socio-economic class.  SpearIt, Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Presentation at the Saint Louis University 
School of Law: Vice-versa: Reframing, Reforming, Pornography Through Prostitution Law 
(July 20, 2011). 
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federal anti-gambling laws have recently been strengthened as a reac-
tion to the growth of Internet gambling.70 
In other instances, state or federal statutes do not prevent a mar-
ket from existing or an activity from taking place, but instead they 
regulate who may participate in the market or otherwise prescribe 
rules to which market participants must adhere.71  At times, the regu-
lation largely replicates the role of custom.72  In other instances, regu-
lations exist for advancing consumer or investor protection.  Exam-
ples of such statutes include the Magnuson-Moss Act,73 which governs 
the form and structure of warranties provided for consumer goods, or 
the rules regarding accredited investors under the Securities and Ex-
change Act.74 
Even when there is no applicable statute explicitly criminalizing 
or regulating a market, the common law doctrines of consideration 
and public policy may play a role in market regulation.  The touch-
stone of contract law is the bargained-for-exchange, the reciprocal in-
ducement of consideration as described by Oliver Wendell Holmes.75  
Long the bane of first-year law students, the doctrine is littered with 
moral commitments76 and promises to make charitable donations.77  
                                                        
 70.  Cherry & Rogers, Prediction Markets, supra note 27, at 834–35. 
 71.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 919–20 (2003) (listing all of the 
groups subject to regulation by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 72.  Id. at 969–70.  Indeed, one commentator has noted that certain provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act inscribed into law the “best practices” that existed at the time.  Id. at 
918. 
 73.  Magnuson-Moss Warranty—FTC Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 106(b), 
88 Stat. 2183, 2188–89 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2306 (2006)). 
 74.  Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2006); see also In re Integrated Res. 
Real Estate Ltd. P’ships Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the 
purpose of the Securities and Exchange Act in exempting those who qualify as accredited 
investors is to facilitate specially designed offerings while also protecting against the dan-
ger posed by the lack of SEC scrutiny of offer and sale). 
 75.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
 76.  See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 256 (N.Y. 1891) (involving a nephew’s promise 
to refrain from vices). 
 77.  See Johnson v. Otterbein Univ., 41 Ohio St. 527, 530 (Ohio 1885) (analyzing con-
sideration in the context of a charitable gift). 
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While not often litigated,78 the doctrine of consideration performs an 
important policing function in terms of decisions about what kinds of 
trades will be enforceable and thus legitimately part of a market 
economy, and what trades are unenforceable.  Public policy is anoth-
er ill-defined doctrine79 but it too has formed the basis for striking 
down particular private bargains.80  From this broad legal overview, I 
turn now to a literature review of commodification theory. 
B.  Scholarly Analysis of Commodification 
In the last two decades, legal scholarship has tried to theorize 
coherent doctrinal approaches to the regulation of markets in human 
tissues and organs,81 sex,82 surrogate pregnancy,83 and even the online 
sale of virginity.84  Over thirty years ago, Elisabeth M. Landes and 
Richard Posner sparked widespread controversy when they began 
writing about the creation of markets for child adoption.85  Proposals 
                                                        
 78.  Among practitioners, the doctrine of consideration would generally be considered 
a “deadletter” since consideration is present in almost all commercial deals with which a 
transactional attorney would have to deal. 
 79.  Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Pa. C.P. 1957). 
 80.  Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246–50 (N.J. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS §§ 178–79 (1981). 
 81.  See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Empires of the Flesh: Tissue and Organ Taboos, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 1219, 1221–22 (2009) (arguing for compensation to family members to increase or-
gan supply rather than modifying default rules of donation); Lisa Milot, What are We—
Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers of Human Body Materials, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2010) (proposing tax reforms to address various types of trans-
actions in body materials).  In her work The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, author Rebecca 
Skloot invites the reader to contemplate some of the questions involved with the commer-
cialization of human tissues.  See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA 
LACKS 315–28 (2010). 
 82.  MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 132 (1996). 
 83.  See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007) (analyzing how the market for surrogacy developed).   
 84.  See Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2010) (re-
counting the story of a 2008 virginity auction at the Moonlite Bunny Ranch in Nevada).  
 85.  See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Short-
age, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) (analyzing the nonmarket regulation of child adoptions); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 409–17 (1992) (same).  The secondary literature 
that has developed in response to this provocative argument has been extensive.  See gener-
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surrounding markets for human organs have also sparked serious de-
bate.86 
Feminist theorists have been at the forefront of this commodifi-
cation discussion, perhaps because some of these markets have gen-
der implications, concern the body, or concern women’s traditional 
roles, which were historically outside and apart from paid labor mar-
kets.87  Many of these theorists were concerned with the dignitary as-
pects of these trades and argued that women’s bodies and reproduc-
tive capacities should not be the subject of trade or market pressures.  
Other feminists were concerned about the exploitation of poor wom-
en by the wealthy, sometimes based on racial lines or the develop-
ment status of the countries in which women lived.  Some were con-
cerned that the monetization of reproductive capacity could only lead 
to further exploitation. 
Although there are a number of conflicting discussions and as-
sumptions surrounding the development of commodification of the 
body, opponents of commodification in these areas voice arguments 
that touch on two general areas of concern.  First, some are con-
cerned that markets can be coercive and play on the desperation that 
arises from abject poverty and economic inequality.88  Second, oppo-
nents argue that commodification will corrupt basic human values, 
meaning that “certain moral and civic goods are diminished or cor-
rupted if bought and sold for money.”89  In other words, particular 
markets might impair the value of human life and, perhaps, dignity.  
While the first argument looks to the ideal of consent, the dignity ar-
gument examines the type of goods offered and questions whether 
                                                        
ally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 203 (2009) (collecting sources). 
 86.  See Roth, supra note 55, at 45–50 (discussing issues surrounding the compensation 
of organ donors); see also Emily C. Lee, Trading Kidneys for Prison Time: When Two Contradic-
tory Legal Traditions Intersect, Which One has the Right-of-Way?, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 507, 508 & 
n.10 (2009) (describing a proposed bill in South Carolina that would have provided good 
time credit for prisoners who became kidney donors (citing S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007))). 
 87.  See generally, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Wil-
liams eds., 2005) (addressing commodification in a feminist context). 
 88.  Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, The Moral Limits of Markets, in 
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 87, at 122. 
 89.  Id. 
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the purchase and sale of those goods will produce good results for so-
ciety overall.90 
Other feminist theorists, including Professors Martha Ertman91 
and Katherine Silbaugh,92 have argued in favor of commodification 
more generally, proposing that familial relations would be more equi-
table if they were to be viewed in monetized terms.  Indeed, Professor 
Kimberly Krawiec has advocated for the monetization of certain of 
these taboo trades, arguing that legalization and monetization of the 
sexual economy could lead to women’s empowerment and more full 
participation in the market economy.93 
While these various arguments in favor or against commodifica-
tion of the body resound in arguments based on either equality or au-
tonomy, Professor Joan Williams notes that perhaps this is a false di-
chotomy.94  Rather than a fully market transaction or a wholly non-
commodified one, Williams suggests that all transactions fall on some 
part of a continuum, which she terms “Differentiated Ties.”95  Some 
amount of commodification of our private lives is inevitable, accord-
ing to Williams, and rather than focus on judging whether this is ap-
propriate or not, she asks several key questions.  Williams exhorts us 
to consider whether the end result of the commodification is liberat-
ing, who controls the process of marketing and receives the proceeds, 
and whether the commodification advances or harms social ties.96  
While “Differentiated Ties” is an awkward terminology that does not 
seem to capture fully Williams’s concept, the questions she poses are 
important, and I return to these insights in the last portion of the Ar-
ticle. 
How does the further development of Internet technology im-
pact some of these unconventional markets?  What is marketable has 
always been contextually and culturally dependent, and has been sub-
                                                        
 90.  Id. at 124. 
 91.  Martha Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (discussing how business models are similar to cohabitation, 
marriage, and polyamory to justify importing elements of business law to improve domes-
tic relations law). 
 92.   Katherine Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65 
(1998) (discussing the selective enforcement of premarital agreements). 
 93.  Krawiec, supra note 84, at 1768–69. 
 94.  Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify That Is Not 
the Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 87, at 362, 368. 
 95.  Id. at 368–69. 
 96.  Id. at 375–77. 
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ject to change over time, apart from any changes in the technological 
mechanisms for market exchange.  But particular aspects of this new 
technology have their own dynamic that seems to encourage com-
modification.  Would even Landes and Posner have predicted an 
online market for human hair?97   
In dealing with sales that concern the body, the Internet reduces 
transaction costs.  These reduced transaction costs can take the form 
of an intermediary website acting as platform.  The legitimacy and ac-
ceptability that such an intermediary conveys may encourage particu-
lar types of transactions to become commodified, and perhaps seem 
more acceptable.  To ask the converse question, how does the theory 
surrounding the first generation of commodification analyses apply to 
the questions of Internet commodification?  Let us turn to some ex-
amples that illustrate the forces pushing toward cyber commodifica-
tion.  I return to the theoretical matters when discussing the implica-
tions of cyber commodification in the last portion of the Article. 
II.  FORCES PROPELLING CYBER COMMODIFICATION 
Several exogenous forces have made cyber commodification in-
creasingly prevalent.  These forces are directly related to several dis-
tinctive traits of the very Internet itself—the ability for market partici-
pants to maintain anonymity, the reduction in transaction costs, the 
increasing irrelevance of geography and even national borders, and 
the lack of clear jurisdictional boundaries.  These forces can best be 
described through accompanying illustrative examples.  For anonymi-
ty, this discussion takes the form of an online market for adultery and 
child naming.  For transaction costs and the decreasing relevance of 
geography, I discuss virtual work and a new method of financing start-
up businesses known as crowdfunding. 
                                                        
 97.  On BuyandSellHair.com, sellers can create listings for their hair, including color 
and length.  See Listings for Hair for Sale, BUYANDSELLHAIR.COM, http://buyandsellhair.com 
/ad-category/hair-for-sale/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  While in developed countries this 
may not be big business, in developing countries the sale of hair can forestall abject pov-
erty.  For example, in Eastern Europe, some children sell their hair for $3.20 to buy food 
and the hair is then sold in the United Kingdom and the United States for thousands of 
dollars.  See Eddie Fitzmaurice, Children Sell Their Hair for $3, SUN-HERALD, Feb. 22, 2004.  
On the other end of the spectrum, many choose to make donations of their hair, through 
organizations such as Locks of Love, to those who need it due to various illnesses or chem-
otherapy.  Mission & Vision, LOCKS OF LOVE, http://www.locksoflove.org/mission.html 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  Note that wigs are not covered by most health insurance plans, 
as they are considered cosmetic. 
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A.  Anonymity 
Anonymity encourages the growth of cyber commodification.  
According to a recent article, “[a]nonymity and pseudonymity are in-
trinsic to, and inseparable from, cyberspace because a computer 
serves as the medium through which interaction is facilitated. . . .  
[T]he identity of each individual is removed either completely or in 
part.”98  The concepts of anonymity and deindividuation have been 
used as frameworks to analyze the proliferation of various types of 
conduct in cyberspace including defamation,99 software piracy,100 
gambling,101 and harassment and cyberbullying.102 
Numerous studies indicate that people behave differently when 
they believe their identity is anonymous.103  The role anonymity plays 
in a person’s decisionmaking, however, is subject to debate.  One 
                                                        
 98.  Sameer Hinduja, Deindividuation and Internet Software Piracy, 11 CYBERPSYCHOL. & 
BEHAV. 391, 392 (2008). 
 99. Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation and Free Expres-
sion on the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 519, 530–32 (2006). 
 100.  Hinduja, supra note 98, at 392.  
 101.  Mark Griffiths et al., Internet Gambling: An Overview of Psychosocial Impacts, 10 UNLV 
GAMING RES. & REV. J. 27, 30 (2006). 
 102.  Warren Chik, Harassment Through the Digital Medium: A Cross-Jurisdictional Compara-
tive Analysis on the Law on Cyberstalking, 3 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 13, 13–14 (2008); Dan-
ielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 63–64 (2009); cf. Frank Pasquale, 
Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediar-
ies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 113 (2010) (describing ways in which negative terms can be 
searched).   
 103.  See, e.g., Katherine S. Williams, On-Line Anonymity, Deindividuation and Freedom of 
Expression and Privacy, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 687, 691 (2006) [hereinafter Williams, On-Line 
Anonymity] (citing GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND (Trans-
action Publishers 1995) (1895)) (describing Le Bon’s theory about the actions of people 
in crowds as an individual going on a “moral or ethical holiday” when “he or she is part of 
a larger and different whole”); M.E. Kabay, Dir. Of Educ., Int’l Computer Sec. Ass’n, 
Presentation at the Annual Conference of the European Institute for Computer Anti-Virus 
Research: Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: Deindividuation, Incivility and 
Lawlessness Versus Freedom and Privacy (Mar. 16, 1998), http://www.mekabay.com/ 
overviews/anonpseudo.pdf (citing Phillip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, 
Reason and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON 
MOTIVATION (W.J. Arnold & D. Levine, eds., University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln) 1969) 
(noting Zimbardo’s suggestion that anonymity is a contributing factor to antisocial behav-
ior).   
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predominant theory104 within the psychological literature is deindi-
viduation, “or the state of alienation, reduced inhibition and lack of 
self-awareness, which occurs when a personal sense of identity is over-
whelmed by that of the group.”105  Early research focused on an indi-
vidual losing self-awareness due to participation in a large group.106  
Even absent group membership, however, anonymity may be a con-
tributing factor to deindividuation because anonymity results in a lack 
of self-awareness.107  This resulting lack of self-awareness can lead to 
disinhibited or anti-normative behavior.108  For example, from the rel-
ative anonymity of a car, a driver is more likely to drive aggressively,109 
a participant in an experiment is more likely to deliver a higher volt-
age of electric shock to his co-participant if his face is concealed,110 
and anonymous students are more likely to write cruel comments 
about instructors in their teaching evaluations.111 
Evidence supporting a causal link between anonymity and certain 
behavior on the Internet is lacking, but several otherwise important 
                                                        
 104.  Social Identity Theory of Deindividuation is particularly relevant in the Internet 
context.  The theory divides the self into two subgroups: (1) personal—the qualities that 
make an individual different from others; and (2) social—the groups the individual be-
longs to and the identity of that person within the groups.  Williams, On-Line Anonymity, 
supra note 103, at 692–93.  Deindividuation results when an individual abandons the per-
sonal identity for the social identity and the norms and frames of reference from different 
groups.  Id.  While anonymity may not cause antinormative behavior, it can facilitate acting 
on impulses or lowering inhibitions, which allow a person to behave in a way she would 
not if she was not anonymous.  John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. 
& BEHAV.  321, 322 (2004).  Most likely, anonymity is simply the best option for someone 
predisposed to antinormative behavior, because it is less likely that he or she will be 
caught.  Katherine S. Williams, Using Tittle’s Control Balance Theory to Understand Computer 
Crime and Deviance, 22 INT’L REV. OF L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 145, 146 (2008). 
 105.  Rowland, supra note 99, at 531. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See Edward Diener, Deindividuation: Causes and Consequences, 5 SOCIAL BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 143, 146 (1977) (noting that several studies have indirectly suggested that 
anonymity “sometimes produces an internal deindividuated state”). 
 108.  Id. at 149. 
 109.  Williams, On-Line Anonymity, supra note 103, at 692 & nn.16, 18 (citing P. Ellison, 
Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behaviour: A Field Study, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 
256 (1995)). 
 110.  Id. (citing Zimbardo, supra note 103, at 237). 
 111.  Mary W. Lindahl & Michael L. Unger, Cruelty in Student Teaching Evaluations, 58 
COLLEGE TEACHING 71, 73 (2010). 
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observations regarding anonymity and Internet behavior exist.  For 
instance, anonymity is rationally chosen by people who do not want to 
be held accountable for their decision-making.112  Anonymity allows 
individuals to engage in a behavior without the fear of stigma associ-
ated with that behavior.113  Further, individuals may act online without 
receiving disapproval or judgment.114  Most importantly, computer-
mediated communication brings individuals into online groups where 
they may potentially act on the norms espoused by the group, thereby 
losing their sense of self-awareness.115  For the sake of balance, it is al-
so important to point out the positive aspects of anonymity: People 
living under oppressive political regimes may seek out information 
from the rest of the world and anonymity can allow for critique of the 
government without fear of repercussions.  Anonymity can allow for 
more personal freedom—for better or worse. 
Currently, the most significant commentary about anonymity, de-
individuation, and behavior on the Internet is in the context of free 
speech and defamation.116  Commentary has focused on harassment 
and its proliferation due to the anonymity of cyberbullies.117  The In-
ternet and other technological advances allow bullying to continue 
around the clock, anonymously, and more maliciously.118  With a feel-
                                                        
 112.  Williams, On-Line Anonymity, supra note 103, at 696.  
 113.  Griffiths et al., supra note 101, at 30. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Williams, On-Line Anonymity, supra note 103, at 694. 
 116.  See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from 
John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373 (2009) (examining the evolution of the law governing libel 
suits against anonymous defendants based on Internet speech); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Si-
lencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 855 (2000) (noting 
that when corporations bring defamation suits against Internet users, these suits threaten 
to suppress legitimate criticism); Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: Protect-
ing John Doe on the Internet, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 469 (2009).  
 117.  See Citron, supra note 102, at 83 (noting that cyberbullies writing under pseudo-
nyms “have little fear that victims will retaliate against them or that they will suffer social 
stigma for their abusive conduct”); Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 51, 56 (2005) (noting that cyberbullies are “emboldened by the anonymity and pseu-
donymity that e-mail and the Internet can provide”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational 
Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705, 749 (2012) (discussing cyberbulling in an educational 
context). 
 118.  See Dickerson, supra note 117, at 56 (noting that “[t]echnology affords bullies 24/7 
access to potential victims”); Mark Franek, Rise of the Cyberbully Demands New Rules, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 10, 2004, at 9 (noting that cyberspace is accessible “just 
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ing of anonymity, bullies on the Internet act on impulse.119  As one 
commentator has noted, “technology allows bullies to be meaner, 
more frequently, with more allies, before an inestimable audience.  It 
gives them a greater sense of invincibility and inhibits their fear of be-
ing caught and punished.”120 
Compared to these free speech and criminal law aspects, relative-
ly little analysis is available on how anonymity drives commodification.  
As many markets in cyberspace feature anonymous or semi-
anonymous transactions, my contention is that they may encourage 
non-traditional markets to form. Aside from facilitating purchases, 
markets also are socially constructed spaces and, in a capitalist econ-
omy, they play a vital role in social interactions.  Consider the local 
souk in a rural agricultural village.  The market brings buyers and 
sellers together to interact in a social space—they can commiserate 
about crop failures, animals, and perhaps learn about larger market 
trends as they talk amongst themselves.  The participants will know 
each other personally, and will be repeat players. 
Participants in an online market, however, act in ways vastly dif-
ferent from the way they would in a village souk.  With technology, 
market participants have little or no information to tell them with 
whom they are dealing.  To substitute for the face-to-face interaction 
between buyers and sellers, other proxies for trust have emerged via 
intermediaries.  For example, seller ratings on platforms such as eBay 
and Amazon.com signal to buyers whether a seller is trustworthy.121  If 
goods are shipped late, damaged, or broken, a seller may receive poor 
ratings, which would warn other purchasers to avoid that merchant.122 
In the past, if a buyer wanted to purchase a good or service from 
the “gray market,” or even a good or service that might be legal, but 
                                                        
about anywhere, anytime”); Glenn R. Stutzky, Cyber Bullying Information, INST. FOR PUB. 
POLICY AND SOC. RESEARCH, http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/Documents/Forums/2006 
_Mar_CYBER_BULLYING_INFORMATION_2006%20—%20Provided%20by%20Mr. 
%20Glenn%20Stutzky.pdf (last visited Sep. 29, 2011) (noting that cyberbullying is “not 
bound by time or geography”); Waldman, supra note 117, at 711-15 (defining and distin-
guishing cyberbullying and cyberattacking). 
 119.  Franek, supra note 118. 
 120.  Dickerson, supra note 117, at 56.  
 121.  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone (and Everything?), 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2006) (discussing eBay’s reputation system as a successful 
means of ensuring the reliability of sales in the online marketplace). 
 122.  Seller Performance Standards, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/seller-
non-performance.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
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was perhaps unsavory, it was difficult to make that purchase anony-
mously.  Certain types of alcoholic beverages could only be purchased 
in certain places, from approved retailers, on particular days and 
times; alcohol bottles were hidden from view in brown paper bags.  
The same is true of pornography or sexual aids.123  If a person physi-
cally had to go out in public to a store in order to purchase such an 
item, there was the risk that they would be seen by a co-worker, friend 
or neighbor.  Along with the purchase came the further risk that the 
purchaser might be judged or ridiculed.  Today, with anonymous 
online shopping, purchasers can buy anything from the most innocu-
ous to the most embarrassing of items without revealing their identi-
ties.  Removing the inhibitions associated with providing one’s name 
means many items can be monetized that would have been unthinka-
ble before. 
The concepts of anonymity and deindividuation therefore be-
come central to any discussion of cyber commodification.  Anonymity 
lends to the proliferation of taboo markets for two reasons.  If a par-
ticipant in a taboo market does not want to be identified or held ac-
countable for his or her participation in the marketplace, then the 
anonymity offered by the Internet is the sensible and rational medium 
for his or her transaction.  The Internet offers greater anonymity than 
face-to-face marketplaces; therefore, a participant, if concerned with 
stigma or judgment, is more likely to conduct his or her transaction 
anonymously on the Internet. 
As an additional matter, Internet marketplaces may display a par-
ticular culture or promote non-normative behavior.  If a specific web-
site or marketplace invites an individual to join a group, the individu-
al’s membership in the group may cause deindividuation and a loss of 
self-awareness.  Membership on a website that then promotes a par-
ticular kind of unconventional marketplace could lead some individ-
uals to a loss of self-awareness and deindividuation.  Here I focus on 
two unconventional markets that are driven by anonymity: the online 
market for adultery and the market for baby naming rights. 
1.  The Market for Adultery 
With its branding tagline, “Life is short[, h]ave an affair,”124 the 
dating website Ashley Madison focuses on a specific demographic: 
                                                        
 123.  Indeed, pornography does a brisk online business.  In 2006, for example, Internet-
based porn sales reached $2.8 billion.  Jon Swartz, Purveyors of Porn Scramble to Keep up with 
Internet, USA TODAY, June 12, 2007, at 4B. 
 124.  ASHLEY MADISON, http://www.ashleymadison.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
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those who are married.125  In the United States, the user demographic 
of the website is heavily male; but in Australia, where prostitution is 
legal, and married men often patronize prostitutes, married women 
often avail themselves of the website.126  Before the advent of the In-
ternet, those who were seeking to have an extra-marital affair could 
not trumpet their desires; a personal advertisement in a newspaper 
could lead to discovery by a spouse.  The Ashley Madison website, 
therefore, thrives on promoting a sense of anonymity in its users’ af-
fairs. 
While posting a profile on the Ashley Madison website is free, 
contacting other members requires payment.127  Users can look at 
other member’s profiles and “test the waters,” but if they want to initi-
ate contact, they have to purchase access.128  Credit card charges show 
up under the name of an innocuous sounding business, so as not to 
alert a suspicious spouse that money is being spent on a dating web-
site.129  Customers can also pay using other means, such as a money 
order, electronic funds transfer from their bank, or pre-paid gift 
card.130  These alternate methods of payment help a customer keep 
his or her use of the website hidden from a partner or spouse. 
Ashley Madison’s business model depends on promoting a sense 
of anonymity among its users; the website therefore strongly promotes 
the concept of privacy and anonymity as a key selling point for its cus-
tomers.  The home page for the website features a woman holding 
her finger over her lips, illustrating the privacy the website offers.131  
The tagline under the website reads, “The world’s leading married 
dating service for discreet encounters,” with the word discreet empha-
sized.132  A Time article discussed the latest marketing tactic used by 
Ashley Madison and other similar websites: mobile cheating.133  The 
                                                        
 125.  See id. (“Ashley Madison is the world’s leading married dating service for discreet 
encounters.”). 
 126.  Adulterers Only, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 18, 2012, at 20. 
 127.  Frequently Asked Questions, ASHLEY MADISON, supra note 124.  
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Adulterers Only, supra note 126.  
 130.  Information on payment methods is available to male users who create a profile at 
ASHLEY MADISON, supra note 124. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Jeremy Caplan, Cheating 2.0: New Mobile Apps Make Adultery Easier, TIME, June 29, 
2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1909602,00.html. 
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websites have created mobile applications or “apps” to allow users to 
search online profiles via their cell phones without leaving suspicious 
electronic trails on their home computer.134  Anonymity on the Inter-
net, however indirectly, has led to the monetization of adultery. 
2.  Baby Names and Branding Rights 
Another example of anonymity facilitating the development of a 
market can be seen in the purchase and sale of baby naming rights.  
Online markets have arisen to facilitate naming and branding.  Sell-
ing naming rights to your child most probably would be seen as odd 
in a small community where everyone knows each other—so odd, in 
fact, that it might even be seen as a matter that should be prevented 
by law.  After all, most people name their children in a way that is 
meaningful within their family, or perhaps to give honor to an histor-
ical figure—not as a way to make money.  Despite that, today some 
parents are selling the rights to name their children online.135 
There is historical precedent addressing the sale of baby names 
in the context of the consideration doctrine.  In an influential 1882 
case, Wolford v. Powers,136 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the 
right to name a child constituted good consideration.137  In that case, 
an elderly friend of the family promised the sum of $10,000 to help 
the family’s younger son complete his education, but asked in return 
that the child be named after him.138  Although the court viewed this 
agreement as similar to a gift to the child, it concluded that the father 
did give up the right to name his son and that naming rights in other 
contexts, such as a named university endowed chair, did have value.139  
Thus the court enforced the promise, holding that consideration ex-
isted.140  A decade later in Diffenderfer v. Scott,141 an Indiana Appeals 
                                                        
 134.  Id. 
 135.  What’s in a Name? Four Thousand and Fifty Dollars, FREAKONOMICS.COM (Jan. 13, 
2009, 9:40 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/01/21/whats-in-a-name-four-
thousand-and-fifty-dollars/?scp=1&sq=baby+naming+rights&st=nyt; Matthew Purdy, Our 
Towns; A Boy Named Soup?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at B1; Joshua Rhett Miller, Woman 
Blames eBay for Thwarting Baby Name Auction, FOX NEWS (Aug. 13, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,539311,00.html. 
 136.  85 Ind. 294 (1882). 
 137.  Id. at 303–04. 
 138.  Id. at 294–95. 
 139.  Id. at 308. 
 140.  Id. at 303–04. 
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Court treated the consideration question as settled, citing Wolford v. 
Powers.142  Similar decisions in other jurisdictions followed, resting up-
on the same logic.143 
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted 
the Wolford rule, noting in Eaton v. Libbey,144 a 1896 case, that “[w]e 
have no doubt that the privilege of naming a child is a valid consider-
ation for a promise. . . .  Gifts to a child because of its name are com-
mon, and a change of name is often made the condition of a gift or 
bequest.”145  Further, in 1914, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts noted in Gardner v. Denison146 that the “privilege of naming a 
child is a valid consideration for a promise to pay money,” and that 
the child “loses the opportunity of receiving a more advantageous 
name, and is compelled to bear whatever detriment may flow from 
the name imposed upon him.”147  While at first, the possibility of “det-
riment” flowing from a name may seem somewhat odd—other than in 
playground teasing—the popular book Freakonomics discusses, at 
length, the fact that there is a correlation between a person’s name 
and his or her job and financial prospects.148 
                                                        
 141.  32 N.E. 87 (Ind. App. 1892). 
 142.  Id. at 88. 
 143.  See, e.g., Whyner v. Berg, 231 P.2d 39, 44 (Cal. 1951) (collecting cases that demon-
strated that “[t]he privilege of naming a child is valid consideration for a promise”); Daily 
v. Minnick, 91 N.W. 913, 914 (Iowa 1902) (citing Wolford v. Powers as one of the cases estab-
lishing that “the privilege of naming a child is a valid and legal consideration for a prom-
ise”); Babcock v. Chase, 36 N.Y.S. 879, 879 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1895) (using the Wolford doc-
trine to determine that naming a child was “sufficient consideration” for a promise).  
 144. 42 N.E. 1127 (Mass. 1896). 
 145.  Id. 
 146. 105 N.E. 359 (Mass. 1914). 
 147.  Id. at 360. 
 148.  See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 179–204 (2005) (dis-
cussing earning prospects for job seekers on the basis of their names); see also Marianne 
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and 
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873 (collect-
ing empirical data showing that having an African American sounding name reduced the 
likelihood of receiving an interview when compared with similarly skilled and educated 
applicant with white sounding names); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any 
Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and 
Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (using the results of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s 
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Many of these well-established precedential cases, however, in-
volved a close relationship, at times with a blood tie, between a family 
and an older, wealthier individual, often a widow or widower without 
children.  For example, in Gardner, the court mentioned that the el-
derly man who made the promise regarding the child’s name lived 
with the family of the child’s father.149  After the will was read, the 
man died without making any provision for the child that had been 
named after him.150  In this way, some of the “bargains” that were 
struck around the child’s name seem like another way of formalizing 
extended familial and caretaking relationships. 
Modern day online auctions of naming rights to children, how-
ever, are structured as impersonal arms-length transactions.  Rather 
than looking like an arrangement to shore up extended familial rela-
tionships, these auctions look more like desperate pleas for money.  
The bids are probably from parents in difficult financial circumstanc-
es who would be willing to name their child “Xanax” or “Clorox” for 
the right amount of money.151  But at the present time, that money 
does not seem to be forthcoming from corporations.152 On the one 
hand, corporations may sense that these types of auctions are still 
somewhat gauche or taboo and would not result in the type of “good 
press” that most businesses seek for publicity purposes.  On the other 
hand, some might feel that any publicity is good publicity—which 
might explain why a casino paid $10,000 to advertise its brand on a 
woman’s forehead.153 
B.  Reduction of Geographic Barriers and Other Transaction Costs 
In addition to anonymity, other features of the Internet seem to 
promote the forces of cyber commodification.  These features include 
the decreasing relevance of geography and even national borders, 
                                                        
investigation to analyze “the effectiveness of Title VII as a remedy for and deterrent to race 
discrimination in the hiring market”).  
 149.  Gardner, 105 N.E. at 360. 
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 151.  Purdy, supra note 135.  
 152.  Don Oldenburg, Ringing Up Baby; Companies Yawned at Child Naming Rights, but Was 
It an Idea Ahead of Its Time?, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, at C10; Matthew Kauffman, New-
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 153. Aaron Falk, Mom Sells Face Space for Tattoo Advertisement, DESERET NEWS (June 30, 
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and the lack of clear jurisdictional legal boundaries.  In short, the In-
ternet lowers transaction costs dramatically, and this propels the forc-
es of commodification.  The two clearest illustrations of these forces 
are virtual work and crowdfunding. 
1.  Virtual Work 
As Internet and computer technology becomes increasingly 
ubiquitous and less expensive, these developments have forged new 
ways to buy and sell not only objects, but also labor and time.  In a 
previous article, I described this phenomena, which I have termed 
“virtual work,”154 but which has also been alternately described as “la-
bor as a service,” “peer production,” or “playbor.”155  As noted by Ran-
dall Stross in the New York Times, crowdsourcing technology has ena-
bled the slicing of labor into small increments, micro-tasks that break 
down a large job into its lowest common denominator.156  After the 
tasks are farmed out to individual workers, they are then re-
aggregated and the overall job is completed.  This is the process 
known as crowdsourcing.157 
In fact, millions of people worldwide entertain themselves or 
supplement their incomes—or both—by working within virtual worlds 
such as Second Life or casually “clicking” to make a few dollars for 
simple tasks on websites like Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk.158  Be-
                                                        
 154.  Cherry, Virtual Work, supra note 30, at 483–84. 
 155.  See Trebor Scholz & Laura Liu, From Mobile Playgrounds to Sweatshop City, in 
SITUATED TECHNOLOGIES PAMPHLETS 7, 10–25 (2010), http://www.situatedtechnologies 
.net/?q=node/105 (discussing the evolution of virtual work and various forms of it). 
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https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited Dec. 19, 2012). 
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cause the money in virtual worlds is convertible to real world money, 
virtual work is having an impact on real world economies.159  One 
economist, Edward Castronova, has estimated that the economy of 
Sony’s game EverQuest and its world, Norrath, has a per capita GNP 
equivalent to that of Bulgaria.160  Another commentator, discussing 
entrepreneurship in virtual worlds, had this to say: 
[V]irtual worlds are home to serious business conducted by 
hundreds of thousands of users.  One study suggests that vir-
tual economies may reach the size of small countries.  The 
business varies from mining virtual gold to real gambling 
and anything in-between.  Virtual world entrepreneurship is 
somewhat ironic.  Much of the fun of virtual worlds is un-
predictability. . . . Yet, entrepreneurship thrives in these 
worlds.  Like any economy, where there is a demand for 
something of value and someone willing to supply it, a mar-
ket will form.161 
These pursuits are far more than mere “games.”  Recently, em-
ployment agencies like Manpower and Randstad have begun recruit-
ing, collecting resumes, and performing interviews with candidates on 
                                                        
 159.  See CASTRONOVA, supra note 158, at 2 (noting that annual exchange of virtual 
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globally). 
 160.  Id. at 19. 
 161.  Michael Risch, Virtual Rule of Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) (footnotes omit-
ted); see also Michael Capiro, Virtual Worlds with Real-World Losses, 56 FED. LAW. 12 (2009) 
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Id. at 1027 (footnote omitted). 
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virtual worlds such as Second Life.162  In the wake of the economic 
downturn, websites such as ELance, which serve to connect compa-
nies seeking short term help with workers willing to take on short 
term assignments, have been doing brisk business.163  Throughout cy-
berspace, workers hold various jobs that, in the words of leading 
commentators, make it possible to “work in a fantasy world to pay rent 
in reality.”164 
Recently, Professor Jonathan Zittrain noted that the advent of 
virtual work simultaneously provides immense promise and peril for 
workers in the new digital economy.165  New technology allowing col-
laboration can provide remarkable opportunities for workers and 
employers alike.  Traditional limitations on collaboration—of travel, 
of meeting, of commuting—can be minimized or reduced.  Employ-
                                                        
 162.  Manpower and Randstad have advertisements posted on YouTube touting their 
recruiting services in Second Life.  See, e.g., Virtual Jobs at Ranstad, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 
2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k5xF43POYv8&feature=PlayList&p=7B20448AB 
A3A94B8&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=43; Manpower’s Machinima on the World of 
Virtual Work, YouTube (July 12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNjxucDI8bo. 
 163.  See Ann Meyer, Fewer Strings a Draw for Employers: Virtual Contract Workers, Internet 
Tools Help Firms Grow, Afford to Add Talent, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2009, at 19 (noting that 
“[y]ear-over-year project hiring on Elance rose 40 percent in October, and more than 
300,000 jobs have been posted on the Web site during the past 12 months”); cf. Emma L. 
Carew, Tough Times Lead many into Virtual Work World, STAR-LEDGER, July 12, 2009, at 6 
(noting that that the poor economy has pushed many employers into hiring virtual office 
assistants). 
 164.  F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 11 (2004). 
 165.  Jonathan Zittrain, Work the New Digital Sweatshops, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7, 2009.  Ac-
cording to Professor Zittrain: 
It all sounds great, and in many ways it is.  The Internet has created new markets 
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ers can use virtual spaces to make contacts and recruit talent, without 
spending money on transportation.166  Certainly, the possibility of 
matching workers and jobs in cyberspace creates more opportunities 
and more efficient labor markets.167  These changes can benefit work-
ers, in part by increasing flexibility and allowing workers more control 
over when and how they are able to perform work.168  In addition, 
employees have used virtual worlds as part of their protected right to 
organize and protest.169  For example, in September 2007, over 2,000 
employees protested IBM Italy’s pay package by appearing at IBM’s 
headquarters in Second Life.170 
Virtual work, however, presents many of the same enduring prob-
lems that workers’ rights advocates have struggled with over the years.  
Gold farming operations171 and other types of virtual work have been 
criticized by commentators as creating new “virtual sweatshops.”172  
For years corporations have engaged in races to the bottom, not only 
in selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation that will govern their in-
                                                        
 166.  See, e.g., Joel Dresang, Manpower Opens Office in Online Virtual Society, MILWAUKEE J. 
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 171.  For a definition of “gold farming,” see infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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Direct Investment, 22 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 63 (2008) (discussing the impact of virtual 
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ternal corporate affairs,173 but also to find the jurisdictions with the 
cheapest labor and the least regulation of employment relation-
ships.174  The concern about virtual work is that it will lead to further 
acceleration of the race to the bottom and ultimately the further ero-
sion of worker’s rights and benefits.175 
In a popular press article, Professor Zittrain set out a useful ty-
pology of crowdsourcing based on the level of knowledge required to 
complete a given work task.176  In the level requiring the most skill, 
companies post difficult scientific problems and promise a reward for 
the answer.177  For example, on the Innocentive website,178 highly 
skilled scientists try to solve complicated problems to reap financial 
prizes.  In the middle skill level, some websites rate and grade workers 
at various tasks to ensure quality control for routine backroom opera-
tions, such as that performed by customer service representatives.179  
For example, on LiveOps,180 telephone calls are routed to individual 
customer service workers on their cell phones.  Finally, at the lowest 
end, there is work that encompasses tasks that require only minimal 
awareness, such as the entry of a few characters or the clicking of a 
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mouse in a second or two.181  Regardless of the level of skill involved, 
crowdsourcing takes the products of many workers to create some-
thing greater than the sum of its parts.182 
Crowdsourcing and other types of distributed work are likely to 
increase in frequency in the years to come.  While Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk was once synonymous with crowdsourcing, there are now 
many more websites that promise to help users harness the power of 
the crowd.183  The tasks that can be assigned through crowdsourcing 
are virtually limitless.184  Other websites work subtly, sometimes with-
out the knowledge of the user.  For example, to prevent websites and 
blogs from being swamped with “spam” from automated comment 
generators, many sites require users to enter a word.185  The reCAP-
TCHA software uses this anti-spam device to digitize books and news-
papers by aggregating them one word at a time.186  In another twist, 
some websites are using fun games to entice users to work for them.  
For example, one website presents players with puzzles, the answers to 
which help scientists determine how proteins fold.187  Crowdsourcing 
has been used to check surveillance cameras at the United States-
Mexico border to look for aliens, and to use computers to help SETI 
in its search for a different type of alien.188 
Other forms of virtual work blur the line between work and lei-
sure.  A number of China’s new “factories” feature computer workers, 
typing and clicking away, playing video games, collecting coins and 
swords, and fighting monsters.189  Known as “gold farmers,” these 
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workers are paid to harvest virtual treasures for online gamers in the 
developed world.190  These affluent gamers want to advance quickly 
within the game and, tired of the repetitive tasks necessary to build a 
high-level character, would prefer to pay others to do the work.191  As 
a result, gold farming operations have appeared in many developing 
countries, where labor costs are low.192  For example, a company 
named Blacksnow opened operations in Tijuana, Mexico, paying 
Mexican nationals dollars a day to kill dragons and obtain objects in 
Mythic Entertainment’s online Camelot game.193  Acting as an inter-
mediary, Blacksnow later resold these virtual objects on eBay194 and 
other online exchange sites to high bidders in developed countries, 
thereby taking advantage of lower labor costs in developing nations.195  
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22, 2007) (terminated after permanent injunction granted, Jan. 28, 2008) (alleging abuses 
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Another model that uses these relative differences in wages is to have 
computer workers in developing countries “play” the characters of 
gamers in developed countries while they sleep.196  Workers in devel-
oping countries are playing these online games not as entertainment, 
but as a means of making a living.197  Their alternatives may include 
far more dangerous work in a dirty, crowded, and unsafe factory or 
barely scraping by as a subsistence farmer.198 
All of this is to say that, because of the way crowdsourcing tech-
nology has developed, and the existing vacuum in meaningful regula-
tion, virtual work straddles the line between commodified and non-
commodified activity.  Virtual work, rather like many other aspects of 
emerging technologies on the internet, is a diverse mix of free collab-
oration coexisting with monetized and commodified settings.199  As 
Professor Lior Strahilevitz has described, one of the models for click-
work depends on collaboration, and this collaboration is not always 
successful if the market economics are subtracted from the equa-
tion.200  It may be that virtual worlds could be big enough for several 
economies (or non-economies, as the case may be) to co-exist with 
each other.  Here is a controversial question: Could non-
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commodification lead to the exploitation of virtual workers?  I return 
to this question in the last Part of the Article. 
2.  Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is an excellent illustration of the forces of cyber 
commodification.  While, traditionally, there have been numerous 
barriers to raising investment capital, such as the limited number of 
individuals with large amounts of money to invest or an innovator’s 
limited ability to find and contact those individuals, these barriers can 
be overcome through new crowdfunding models.201 
Crowdfunding appeals to those with small amounts of money to 
invest.202  Crowdfunding websites allow entrepreneurs to communi-
cate information about their businesses and endeavors to a larger au-
dience.203  According to a recent book, crowdfunding covers a multi-
tude of activities: 
Crowdfunding describes the collective cooperation, atten-
tion and trust by people who network and pool their money 
and other resources together, usually via the Internet, to 
support efforts initiated by other people or organiza-
tions . . . .  The crowdfunding space is quite diverse, com-
prised of many niches, and shares a lot of social network-
ing’s energy.  Whether to solicit donations and create a fan 
base for an around-the-world sailing adventure, to pre-sell 
copies of a book, or to finance a startup in return for equity, 
some form of crowdfunding is available.204 
Pooling their money allows individuals with only small amounts 
to invest the ability to join in the market, often helping artists and 
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musicians produce their work or helping charitable organizations get 
off the ground.205 
Until very recently, there was no exemption from the securities 
laws for crowdfunding, since a general solicitation on a website would 
have run afoul of the 1933 Securities and Exchange Act rules against 
unregistered public offerings.206  As a result, in recent years crowd-
funding websites turned to alternative and creative investment forms.  
For example, some crowdfunding websites followed the model of the 
website Kiva,207 which promotes microfinance and promises no return 
or interest on the amount, just a return of the capital.208  In these ways 
people can put up small amounts of money for a good cause, rather 
like a donation to a social entrepreneurship model like the Grameen 
Bank.209  Other websites, like Kickstarter210 and IndieGoGo,211 provided 
those who put up money receive a return in the form of discounted 
products or free merchandise, but not the customary monetary divi-
dend traditionally associated with stock.212 
In April, 2012, the JOBS Act was signed into law, creating a small 
exemption for crowdfunding.  The new law allows for a limited ex-
emption for crowdfunding of up to $1 million per year, with certain 
limits on amounts per investor based on annual income or net worth, 
and with particular requirements that crowdsourcing websites and 
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companies using those websites must meet.213  Needless to say, the 
regulatory atmosphere for crowdfunding has now changed dramati-
cally.  Professor Steven Bradford notes, however, that the costs of 
complying with the crowdfunding exemption may be high enough 
that only high profile or well-funded companies may be able to use it; 
of course that somewhat defeats the purpose of assisting start-up 
companies with their financing.214  While the regulatory environment 
for crowdfunding has improved, we will need to see whether barriers 
to entry will inhibit its growth. 
III.  THE PROCESS OF CYBER COMMODIFICATION 
Historically, it is not uncommon for innovation to start with gift-
ed amateurs inventing or acting out of passion, then for the advance 
to be taken over by business people and investors who integrate the 
innovation into the existing economy and develop it for profit.  One 
could think about the development of cell phones and their relation-
ship to the earlier ham radio operators on the autopatch.215  Thinking 
back to the Huffington Post example, what began as a gathering akin to 
a liberal town hall meeting eventually became something closer to a 
for-profit new-media business.  This Part examines the business model 
of craigslist, the monetization of Facebook, and the growth of social 
entrepreneurship. 
A.  Free or Not to Be?: The Clash between eBay and Craigslist 
In 2004, online auction giant eBay216 sought to acquire 
craigslist,217 the largest online site for classified advertisements in 
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North America.218  While two of craigslist’s founders, Craig Newmark 
and John Buckmaster, were not interested in selling the company, 
they were amenable to having eBay buy out the shares of the remain-
ing (third) shareholder, who was actively shopping his shares.219  Un-
derstanding that they would only acquire a minority holding of 
28.4%, eBay sought to protect its interests through cumulative voting 
rights.220  Mathematically, cumulative voting would give eBay one seat 
on the three-person craigslist board, with Newmark and Buckmaster 
as the two other directors.221  From their perspective, Newmark and 
Buckmaster were concerned that eBay would use the information they 
learned as shareholders to compete with craigslist.222  As such, they 
built in provisions to remove certain rights from eBay’s equity shares 
if eBay started a competing business.223 
From the beginning, the relationship between eBay and craigslist 
was particularly fraught.  In his 2010 opinion, Chancellor Chandler of 
the Delaware Court of Chancery categorized the two companies as 
“[o]il and [w]ater.”224  Expounding upon this theme, Chancellor 
Chandler explained: 
 [E]ven though both companies enjoy household-name sta-
tus, craigslist and eBay are, to put it mildly, different ani-
mals.  Indeed, the two companies are a study in contrasts, 
with different business strategies, different cultures, and dif-
ferent perspectives on what it means to run a successful 
business. . . .  Though a for-profit concern, craigslist largely 
operates its business as a community service.  Nearly all clas-
sified advertisements are placed on craigslist free of charge.  
Moreover, craigslist does not sell advertising space on its 
website to third parties. . . .  For most of its history craigslist 
has not focused on “monetizing” its site.  The relatively small 
amount of monetization craigslist has pursued (for select job 
postings and apartment listings) does not approach what 
many craigslist competitors would consider an optimal or 
even minimally acceptable level. . . .  eBay is a for-profit con-
cern that operates its business with an eye to maximizing 
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revenues, profits, and market share. . . .  It has a large man-
agement team and a formal management structure.  It em-
ploys over 16,000 people at multiple locations around the 
world. . . .  It might be said that “eBay” is a moniker for 
monetization and that “craigslist” is anything but.225 
The clash of values played itself out in the years after eBay’s in-
vestment and eventually led to the dispute that landed the parties in 
the Delaware courts.  During this time, eBay advised craigslist on ways 
to monetize the website, while Craig Newmark and John Buckmaster 
rebuffed eBay’s suggestions.226  Meanwhile, eBay decided to launch its 
own competing platform for online classifieds, Kijiji.com.227  Launch-
ing the competing website triggered serious consequences for eBay’s 
investment, leading its shares to lose some of their associated rights, 
per the original terms of the investment contract.228  Chancellor 
Chandler ruled that while the new staggered board structure that 
craigslist put in place was contemplated by the shareholder’s agree-
ment and was permissible, the poison pill and right of first refusal 
provisions were impermissible.229 
In discussing the implementation of the poison pill, and the 
threat to its corporate culture that craigslist perceived, the Delaware 
Chancery Court engaged in a lengthy discussion about profit maximi-
zation.  As the court noted in discussing the craigslist business model: 
 Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe 
craigslist should not be about the business of stockholder 
wealth maximization, now or in the future. . . .  The corpo-
rate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an ap-
propriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not 
when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a 
return on their investment.  Jim and Craig opted to form 
craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntari-
ly accepted millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transac-
tion whereby eBay became a stockholder.  Having chosen a 
for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound 
by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that 
form.  Those standards include acting to promote the value 
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of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.  The 
“Inc.” after the company name has to mean at least that.230 
Here, the court privileged eBay’s more traditional business mod-
el and the concept of shareholder primacy above craigslist’s “public 
service” business model.231  But in the new Internet economy, the 
business model craiglist uses is not as odd as Chancellor Chandler’s 
opinion might lead us to believe.  Many of us might pay a few cents to 
query directions from an online GPS mapping program each time we 
use it.  Others might pay to get information that is now freely availa-
ble on Wikipedia or other websites.232  Instead, however, these services 
choose not to monetize, opting to build a free, open access service. 
Similarly, rather than try to achieve maximum returns by wring-
ing every advertising dollar from its site, craigslist opted to build its 
user base with a free and uncomplicated interface.  By charging land-
lords a small fee to list properties in New York City, and also charging 
employers for listing want-ads, craigslist keeps itself afloat while attain-
ing modest returns.233  If the format of the website were to change too 
drastically, including too much monetization, craigslist might encoun-
ter resistance from users.  In other words, once a non-commodified 
website begins to include too many monetized elements, it might risk 
losing its user base.  Too much monetization too quickly could prove 
to be the end of many a once-convenient website.  And without the 
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power of the crowd behind it, a business that relies on user input and 
content may find itself out of business entirely. 
Despite all of these possible justifications for craigslist to operate 
as it did, the Delaware Chancery Court insisted upon analyzing the 
problem through the narrow lens of shareholder profit maximization.  
As such, the “eBay model” was triumphant.234  In light of this holding, 
it might be best for us to acknowledge that the temptation to mone-
tize something free may always be there, not just because of moral 
hazard, but also because corporate law might suggest such a result as 
the default rule.235  Whether this default is normatively desirable may 
be another question.236  The monetization of friendship is also a part 
of the process of cyber commodification, and I turn to that discussion 
next. 
B.  Social NetWORKing 
Another example of the process of commodification can be seen 
in the monetization of friendship.  Currently valued at an estimated 
$100 billion,237 Facebook can be both a valuable personal and business 
networking application.238  Indeed, in both the for-profit and non-
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profit sectors, social networking is hailed as a major trend.239  Tradi-
tionally, friendship is seen as a gift freely given, separate and apart 
from money.240  With the advent of social networking, however, the 
monetization of friendship is increasingly possible and companies are 
beginning to take advantage of this new business model.241  The 
commodification of friendship may, however, have some unintended 
consequences. 
As Stephanie Rosenbloom reports in the New York Times, 
“[i]magine a world in which we are assigned a number that indicates 
how influential we are.”242  New businesses such as Klout,243 PeerIn-
dex,244 and Twitter Grader245 datamine social media activities and as-
sign those who use them so-called influence scores.246  These scores 
are based on online social networking activity, and increase depend-
ing on the number of followers and friends that a user has been able 
to attract.247  As a user recommends a business to the user’s social net-
work friends and they follow suit, the user’s influence score rises.  
Currently, those with high scores get preferential treatment from re-
tailers.  According to the story, more than 2,500 marketers are now 
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using Klout’s data, including companies as diverse as Audi and the 
Las Vegas Palms.248 
In a blog post analyzing the New York Times article, Professor Dan-
ielle Citron writes: 
 What’s troubling is the trend’s implications for society and 
culture.  It seems old school to say that people blog, make 
friends, and engage in online chats to play, experiment, and 
create culture.  Now, they may feel pressured to do all of 
these things as a matter of economic necessity.  We may for-
go experimentation for product endorsements, and idle 
chatter for better job prospects.  This makes our children’s 
choice to engage with social media seem like less of choice 
than a carefully cultivated necessity.249 
As Professor Citron’s comment contemplates, and as the previous 
Section describing crowdsourcing has noted, the divide between “vir-
tual work” and “virtual leisure” is a difficult one.  So too is the gap be-
tween what is fun and pleasurable on Facebook and what provides a 
monetary benefit.  Using Facebook is free, but additional users help 
expand the monetization as they represent an addition to the audi-
ence for potential advertising.250  Facebook merely provides the plat-
form.  On its own, without someone’s friends on it as members as 
well, Facebook would not provide a very satisfying experience.  Ra-
ther, it is the user-generated content, which Facebook then owns, that 
provides the true value of the website.251 
C.  From Networking to Social Entrepreneurship 
The idea that social ties are valuable and subject to monetization 
certainly is one example of cyber commodification.  But there are 
other, more philanthropic ways of combining business, social net-
working, and technology, specifically in the form of a new model 
called social entrepreneurship.  As one author explains, “to qualify as 
social entrepreneurship the activity must not only be entrepreneurial 
                                                        
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Danielle Citron, Scoring Ourselves to Economic Death, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 
28, 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/scoring-
ourselves-to-economic-death.html. 
 250.  See Somini Sengupta, So Much for Sharing his “Like,” N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1 
(noting that marketers “leverag[e] one [Facebook] user’s stated preference . . . and 
spread[] the word to that user’s friends”). 
 251.  Id. 
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and social in nature, but also groundbreaking in scale and effect.”252  
Professor Celia Taylor notes that for a business model to qualify as so-
cial entrepreneurship, an “entity must engage in ordinary, viable 
business enterprise. . . .  [H]owever, a social business must be created 
and run for the express purpose of pursuing specific, articulated so-
cial goals, rather than maximizing profit.”253  The concept is somewhat 
related to corporate social responsibility (“CSR”), because social en-
trepreneurs like those who believe in CSR, aim to provide two interre-
lated goals, financial profit and social progress.254  As one author ex-
plains, however, they are different in the sense that social 
entrepreneurship is, of necessity, built into the business, rather than 
CSR, which may in some instances be “bolted on.”255  Without the so-
cial goal, the socially entrepreneurial business would not exist.256 
As social entrepreneurship is a fairly new concept, there are not 
yet many concrete examples, and defining a social business can result 
in some measure of interpretation and debate.257  One current busi-
ness model that seems to exemplify social entrepreneurship is micro-
finance.  Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus conceived of his 
plan for microfinance based on his own observations of Bangladeshi 
poverty and the provision of small personal loans from his own pock-
et.258  The idea was to assist some of the poorest people in the world by 
providing seed money for small businesses that would also enrich 
their communities by providing much-needed services.  In such a way, 
                                                        
 252.  David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 297 
(2008). 
 253.  Celia R. Taylor, Berle and Social Business: A Consideration, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1501, 1505 (2011).   
 254.  See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How 
the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 634 (2007) (discussing legal aspects of social entrepreneurship); see 
also What Is Social Entrepreneurship? The New Heroes, PBS (2005), http://www.pbs.org/ 
opb/thenewheroes/whatis/ (describing social entrepreneurship movement). 
 255.  MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 
3 (2011). 
 256.  Id. at 4. 
 257.  S. Travis Certo & Toyah Miller, Social Entrepreneurship: Key Issues and Concepts, 51 
BUS. HORIZONS 268 (2008).   
 258.  Biography of Dr. Muhammad Yunus, GRAMEEN BANK (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.grameen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=329&&Itemid=
363. 
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a small amount of money could yield large social dividends.259  Today, 
the Grameen Bank has grown with international philanthropic sup-
port, but “Grameencredit” maintains as its most distinctive feature 
that the loans are based on trust, not collateral.260  Other programs 
may help teach those living in poverty skills such as installing solar 
panels, which can help that person financially, and also increase the 
standard of living in impoverished communities.261 
Individuals will likely donate either their money or their time to 
socially entrepreneurial ventures for purely philanthropic reasons 
and, while these may be the motivations for corporate donations as 
well, a business might have other goals in engaging in social entre-
preneurship.  Investing and participating in social businesses can un-
cover new markets for the sale of goods and services.  As one com-
mentator notes, “[s]ocial ventures can provide important access to 
markets, which companies can then capitalize on with their profit-
maximizing operations.”262  Corporations can also benefit from engag-
ing in social business as a research opportunity to learn about the 
people, the culture, and the resources in the particular geographic 
area where a social enterprise is implemented.263 
In other words, social entrepreneurship is a composite of various 
business models, with a lesser degree of commodification.  Other 
such “hybrid” business models are currently being developed, includ-
ing businesses that focus on sustainability and those that have regis-
                                                        
 259.  What Is Microcredit?, GRAMEEN BANK (Oct. 2011), http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=108. 
 260.  Id.  In contrast, Professor Kerr attributes social entrepreneurship to philanthropy 
by wealthy technology investors.  As she puts it: 
[The] idea of social entrepreneurship was born in the early 1990s when “a hand-
ful of wealthy executives and investors, most of them connected in some way to 
the budding tech boom, began to think about how philanthropy might work 
[differently and] about how they could take what made them rich in business 
and apply those tactics to charity.” 
Kerr, supra note 254, at 624 (second alteration in original). 
 261.  See, e.g., Grameen Families Organizations, GRAMEEN BANK (Aug. 23, 2011), 
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=465&Item 
id=547 (discussing a non-profit initative to provide renewable energy resources in rural 
areas of Bangladesh). 
 262.  Taylor, supra note 253, at 1507. 
 263.  Id. at 1508. 
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tered as B Corporations.264  The desire for profit helps individuals 
while also benefiting communities and leading to an increase in 
knowledge and human capital.  While many of the problems and dis-
putes surrounding commodification involve an incongruous clash of 
expectations around profit, social entrepreneurship may provide a 
template for navigating mixed or partially commodified business 
models.  Other ways of reconciling cyber commodification, however, 
have not been so successful.  And so from the topic of the process of 
cyber commodification, we turn to the area of contests and disputes. 
IV.  CONTESTS AND DISPUTES 
As we saw in the Introduction, differing expectations over the na-
ture of the Huffington Post—whether the blog was intended as an 
online forum for the liberal community or a for-profit entity—created 
a clash of values and ultimately led to a lawsuit.  Whether it is the ex-
pectations of virtual workers, the question of whether predictions 
about the future can be monetized, or how access to legal research 
materials should be apportioned, the same questions of commodifica-
tion and conflicting expectations run throughout many of the exam-
ples provided.  We have seen that commodification is not necessarily 
bad—in virtual work, in fact, it may be a necessity to ensure that 
workers receive a living wage.  Disputes tend to occur, however, when 
one group comes to a contractual relationship believing that they are 
participating in a non-commodified website, when really the creators 
of the website have monetization of the website in mind.  In this Part, 
I will examine some of the instances where there have been contests 
and disputes over cyber commodification.  I begin with an analysis of 
the commodification of knowledge in prediction markets, then shift 
to the market for legal research, and end with an analysis of “free” Wi-
Fi. 
                                                        
 264.  B Corporations, or “Benefit Corporations” are hybrids between for-profit and non-
profit companies.  As a “B Corporation,” a company pledges to work toward other factors 
other than profit, including environmental impact, positive treatment of workers, and 
community relations.  The company then files independently verified reports document-
ing its efforts to maintain B Corporation status.  Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Leg-
islation, Version 1.0—A Breakthrough in Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047 
(2011); Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 63 
(2010); Danielle Douglas, Benefit Corporations Sign up, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2011, at A11. 
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A.  Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets, also known as information markets, or idea 
futures, are a relatively new technology that allows many individuals to 
express their opinions on the Internet in a market setting.265  By let-
ting people put “their money where their mouth is,” prediction mar-
kets encourage thousands of people to join together in cyberspace to 
predict future events.266  These markets are more than games of 
chance or entertainment, as they draw on the unique information, 
knowledge, and skills that individual participants bring with them to 
the market.  Prediction markets enable everyone to reap the benefit 
of the participants’ collective wisdom and, in so doing, advance utili-
tarian goals, creating social welfare and monetary value that go be-
yond the amounts invested in the markets. 
Prediction markets organize and aggregate individual knowledge 
into a collective result.267  Each individual who is a trader in the in-
formation market acts to maximize his or her own reward.  At the 
same time, the organizers of the market collectivize the results and 
harvest the valuable information that market participants have gener-
ated.  In his popular book, The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki 
explains numerous ways in which such collective knowledge can be 
employed.268  Whether individuals are asked to estimate the location 
of a sunken submarine,269 to guess the weight of an ox,270 or to help a 
contestant on the game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire,271 groups 
provided accurate answers to questions that most individuals would 
not have been able to answer on their own.  In a prediction market, 
                                                        
 265.  ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 27, at 1–8. 
 266.  Id. at 8. 
 267.  See id. (noting that a prediction market, “can serve as a relatively simple technolo-
gy for aggregating individual probability assessments”). 
 268.  JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xiv, 3–4 (2004).  
 269.  Id. at xx–xxi. 
 270.  Id. at xi–xiii. 
 271.  On the television program Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, contestants answer trivia 
questions in multiple-choice format.  Each contestant has several “lifelines” they can use, 
including narrowing the options, telephoning a friend, and polling the audience.  Alt-
hough the first two options are often helpful, the audience for the television program is 
the most helpful of all, achieving a ninety-one percent success rate.  Id. at 3–4.   
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individuals are given incentives to trade and contribute their 
knowledge in a formalized setting.272 
The theory behind information markets is loosely related to the 
semi-strong version of the efficient market hypothesis (“EMH”), 
which holds that, in a properly functioning capital market, the prices 
of securities will reflect all relevant publicly available information.273  
The price of a security on the market encodes a significant amount of 
information, including beliefs about the efficacy of management, the 
potential for future products, or market expansions.274  In other 
words, most markets have a “price discovery” function, aggregating 
information and predictions into the current price of that security.275  
In traditional capital markets, however, the information-seeking as-
pects are, to a certain degree, by-products of trading and raising capi-
tal.  In contrast, this information-seeking is the sole reason for the in-
formation market’s existence. 
At present, there are numerous information markets successfully 
making predictions.  Perhaps most notably, especially during past hot-
ly contested presidential elections, is the Iowa Electronic Markets 
(“IEM”).276  The IEM, started in 1988 by academics at the University of 
Iowa Business School, has been operating since that time to predict 
the outcomes of various elections.277  An individual trader is limited to 
a $500 investment, so although the financial stake of any one person 
in the outcome is modest, each still has a financial incentive for mak-
                                                        
 272.  Joshua Blackman et al., Fantasy Scotus: Crowdsourcing a Prediction Market for the Su-
preme Court, 10 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 125, 130 (2012). 
 273.  Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 552–53 (1984). 
 274.  See Fama, supra note 273, at 383. 
 275.  See generally Michael T. Chng, A Model of Price Discovery and Market Design: Theory and 
Empirical Theory, 24 J. FUTURE MARKETS 1107, 1108–10 (2004) (describing price discovery 
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 276.  See, e.g., Jordan Erin, Iowa Electronic Markets Yield Near-Accurate Result, DES MOINES 
REG., Nov. 10, 2004, at B5 (discussing the relative accuracy of online futures markets com-
pared to polls). 
 277.  JOYCE BERG ET AL., RESULTS FROM A DOZEN YEARS OF ELECTION FUTURES MARKETS 
RESEARCH 1 (2000) [hereinafter BERG ET AL., RESULTS], available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/BFNR_2000.pdf.  The IEM has also expanded 
into predictions further afield from its base of political predictions.  Id. at 7 n.10; see also 
Jordan Erin, U of I Markets Tapped to Predict Flu Activity, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 22, 2004, at 
B1 (discussing the use of IEM to predict flu activity).  
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ing a correct prediction.278 The IEM has predicted the outcomes of 
elections more accurately than polls have, beating the polls seventy-six 
percent of the time.279  This accuracy occurs despite the fact that re-
searchers at the University of Iowa have concluded that many of the 
market participants exhibit a strong bias toward one candidate or 
other.280  Apparently, the market is able to correct for these biases 
through arbitrage;281 sensing an opportunity for profit, arbitrageurs 
temper the ideological biases that some of the participants bring with 
them when they make their initial investment in the IEM.282  Other 
similar political prediction markets have appeared to predict the out-
come of elections in Austria,283 Germany,284 and Canada.285 
At the same time that prediction markets started to become more 
common, the legal regime surrounding “real” money markets became 
                                                        
 278.  See Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the 
Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2003) (ex-
plaining that the IEM “is a controlled environment . . . which allows participants to invest 
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 279.  JOYCE BERG, ET AL., ACCURACY AND FORECAST STANDARD ERROR OF PREDICTION 
MARKETS 12–13, 33 tbl.3. (2003) [hereinafter BERG ET AL., ACCURACY], available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/forecasting.pdf. 
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age voter.  BERG, ET AL., ACCURACY, supra note 279, at 10. 
 281.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Be-
havioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 140 n.15 (2002).  Professor 
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 282.  BERG ET AL., RESULTS, supra note 280, at 6. 
 283.  AUSTRIAN POLITICAL STOCK MARKETS / AUSTRIAN ELECTRONIC MARKETS, 
http://www.ebweb.at/apsm/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (information markets predicting 
outcomes of Austrian elections). 
 284.  WAHLSTREET, http://www.wahlstreet.de (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (information 
market predicting outcomes of German elections). 
 285.  ELECTION STOCK MARKET, http://esm.ubc.ca (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (infor-
mation market predicting outcomes of Canadian elections). 
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more chilly.286  In 2006, an online gambling ban enacted in the Unit-
ed States had a devastating effect on the growth of publicly available 
prediction markets.287  Although prediction markets are not the same 
as betting in a horse race, the prediction market seeks information 
above and beyond allocation between players, the law was written so 
broadly that prediction markets were swept into its coverage.288  De-
spite some argument on the part of the author that prediction mar-
kets involved speech and expressive conduct, the gambling ban has 
meant that the majority of publicly available prediction markets have 
either been forced into using play money or have taken their opera-
tions overseas.289 
Ultimately, the regulatory ban on using money in prediction 
markets effectively frustrated the development of an important in-
formation-gathering technology.  The larger point, which I return to 
in Part VI, is that commodification in and of itself is not necessarily 
“bad” when it comes to a developing technology.  In fact, commodifi-
cation can be quite beneficial at times, especially when it functions to 
incentivize participants to reveal information, predictions, and 
knowledge that could benefit others.  While some commodification 
situations cry out for more regulation, perhaps because of the desper-
ation of those engaged in them, or some idea of exploitation, those 
elements could not be further from the type of useful predictive activ-
ity present in an information market.  As such, regulation of commod-
ification should be fully analyzed before being imposed—especially 
when the technology affected in this instance was not even truly the 
                                                        
 286.  Miriam A. Cherry, Morality and Markets: A Comment on Predicting Crime, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 73, 73–74 (2010). 
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Act of 2006, Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–347, 
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subject of the regulation.  With that lesson, I turn to see how access to 
legal and government materials has been commodified, somewhat in 
defiance of the notion that these materials should be publicly availa-
ble to all citizens.  Recent developments are somewhat encouraging 
that access to information may be more forthcoming—but this area is 
also not without its dispute. 
B.  The Monetization of Legal Research and an Online Clearinghouse for 
Legal Academia 
In a common-law, precedent-based system such as the one we 
have in the United States, the strength of a legal argument rests, in 
large part, on how other courts have resolved the same or similar is-
sues.290  Such a system leads to consistency of results, and with con-
sistency comes stability.  Access to justice, therefore, largely rests on 
having access to earlier decided cases.  Local governments, states, and 
the federal government, however, have been slow to make materials 
accessible, even though the justice system is supported by taxpayers.291  
While some law libraries feature open access to the public, others are 
privately run.292  But access to a law library does not necessarily guar-
antee up-to-date legal research.  Among print resources, it is difficult 
and time-consuming to check to see if a particular case has been over-
ruled or otherwise called into question.293  Without any ability to use 
computerized searching, and given the sheer volume of what one per-
son might need to sift through, the quest for cases in print format can 
be difficult and time-consuming.294 
                                                        
 290.  See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, 
Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. 
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For years, for-profit companies have filled this gap in access to 
online resources.  Various CDs with legal information are available for 
purchase from a variety of vendors.295  For the most part, however, the 
need for computerized research has been filled by two for-profit 
companies, Westlaw296 and Lexis.297  These two providers feature 
searchable databases in which users can enter Boolean searches to 
find applicable case law, statutes, law review articles, and newspaper 
articles.  Further, users of both these databases can perform an auto-
mated check to see what other cases have cited any case they are ex-
amining and to see, ultimately, if any particular case has been over-
ruled or otherwise had its authority called into question.298  These 
commercialized databases were problematic for access, however, in 
that they have historically charged a substantial sum for their ser-
vices.299  As more and more other services migrated online, Lexis and 
Westlaw also moved to a world-wide-web model, which meant that 
their users could access the service whether researching from work, 
from the library, at home, or elsewhere.  Still, the service remained 
expensive and there were few competitors to challenge the market 
domination.300  Paradoxically, access to materials written by judges 
and legislators—all of which was meant to be open to the public—
became proprietary and commercialized simply because Westlaw and 
Lexis allowed users to search effectively and conveniently.301 
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The same access problem is also present with academic legal re-
search.302  In the field of legal studies, law review articles and other le-
gal academic writing has historically been difficult for the public to 
access freely.303  Most law schools publish a law review, and in some in-
stances schools also publish secondary journals specializing in a par-
ticular type of legal scholarship.  Historically, law reviews were only 
available to those that had a subscription, with the result that law li-
braries were one of the few places these materials were available.  As 
technology developed, Westlaw and Lexis placed law review articles 
online.  While legal academics and law students worked for free to 
write and edit these articles, these online databases charged their sub-
scribers for access to these works.  Not only are these databases ex-
pensive, but a year or more would often pass between the time au-
thors submitted their work to the law review and the time when the 
article actually would be available on the electronic database.304 
More recently, many law reviews began making published articles 
available for free on their websites.305  While this was a significant step 
toward more accessibility, there is no centralized aggregating or in-
dexing service that allows for search across different law review web-
sites.  Likewise, law journals only post the final versions of articles, 
meaning that there continues to be a significant time lag between 
when an article is given to the law review editors and when it becomes 
available to the public.306 
Enter the Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”), which 
touted its website307 as a free platform for housing academic research 
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in the social sciences.308  The SSRN website is a platform that allows 
registered users to post drafts of their articles to the Internet.309  Alt-
hough SSRN does not allow for content searching in the same way as 
commercial database like Westlaw or Lexis, it has the advantage of 
making an author’s work almost immediately available.  The fact that 
it is a free service is a huge assistance to those who are searching for 
legal knowledge but do not have access to expensive databases.  This 
was such an advantage that many thought of SSRN as cutting edge—a 
new and revolutionary “open access” way of thinking about legal and 
social science scholarship.310  Legal academics were able to point oth-
ers to their work quickly and for free, expanding their readership and 
the audience for their ideas. 311 
Quickly, however, concerns among academics began to emerge.  
Even though SSRN had acted in many ways like an open access non-
profit and was run by prominent academics, the website is actually 
structured as a for-profit corporation.312  Many academics found out 
about the for-profit nature of SSRN in surprising ways.  First, there 
was a false alarm that SSRN was going to charge for access to papers.  
It was then learned that SSRN would not charge for Internet viewing 
but would sell bound hard copies of papers to those who wanted such 
a printout.313  Later, users of the website began to see advertisements 
on the sides of the screen that were tied to the topics of the papers 
that were being searched.  Further, any article that was posted on 
SSRN received an SSRN watermark down the middle of the page as a 
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form of advertising.314  Through all of these efforts, SSRN has been 
testing ways to commercialize its website but the professors who were 
posting papers did not necessarily realize that their postings were in 
the process of being commercialized by others. 
As Professor James Grimmelmann noted, in describing the rea-
sons that he was choosing to post his research papers elsewhere: 
 [I]f you make your money by selling subscriptions, then it 
makes institutional sense to place your own advertising on 
the goods.  Never mind what these decisions do to open ac-
cess to scholarship.  That’s no longer the point.  SSRN is a for-
profit corporation.  It’s not yet (I think) a money-making 
corporation, but its goal is to make money for its owners.  It 
has chosen to do so by providing useful open-access services 
to scholars, but when push comes to shove, the bottom line 
comes before the open access part.  We don’t need to blame 
SSRN or find fault with it.  It’s just doing what comes natu-
rally—making the decision that [it has] supplied sufficient 
open access to fit into a market niche and declaring that 
good enough.315 
In other words, whether a website promotes an open access ethic 
or is a commercialized venture is an important norm.  When opera-
tors of platforms and users are not in agreement about what those 
norms should be, disputes arise.  While at first SSRN seemed to prom-
ise a revolution in open access that might make a very real difference 
in the status quo of legal research, the question is whether it will ded-
icate itself to that mission in the future.  Will the owners of SSRN suc-
cumb to moral hazard?  SSRN may be poised for the same type of dis-
pute between owners and users that rocked the Huffington Post. 
C.  “Free” Wi-Fi 
Another area of contest and dispute about monetization con-
cerns the provision of wireless fidelity (“Wi-Fi”).  Wi-Fi is an almost 
ubiquitous recent phenomenon, allowing Internet access in public 
settings, such as coffee shops, restaurants, hotels, or airports.  At the 
end of the 1990s, small, independent, local businesses tended to pro-
vide free Internet service and chains and large businesses tended to 
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charge customers for access.  Within the last year or so, however, the 
market has undergone a paradigm shift, with large chains now offer-
ing free Wi-Fi.316  Meanwhile, small businesses, perhaps because of the 
challenging economic environment during the recession, have started 
charging for their Wi-Fi services.317 
Wi-Fi, which had existed on some university campuses, started to 
see more widespread adoption around the turn of the century.318  
Among one of the first commercial users of this new technology was 
Starbucks, which announced at the beginning of 2001 that they would 
begin rolling out Wi-Fi access across the United States in a partner-
ship with MobileStar.319  The results were incredible: By the end of the 
year, over five hundred Starbucks had installed Wi-Fi and had high 
transmission speeds.320  Access to the Starbucks network did not come 
cheaply, however.  Users could choose between $15.95 a month for 
unlimited access, or use a pay-as-you-go plan which cost “about $3 for 
fifteen minutes.”321  Only ten months after the announced partnership 
with Starbucks, MobileStar went out of business, and at least one ana-
lyst speculated that the high cost of its pricing structure was to 
blame.322  Quickly, other Wi-Fi providers moved into the market, and 
some began offering free access—perhaps most noticeably a non-
profit which provided free Wi-Fi to areas in New York City.323 
By 2003, news accounts noted that Wi-Fi access in commercial 
space had increased to include the now-defunct Borders Books and 
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McDonald’s, smaller retailers, and some locations in Canada.324  Pric-
ing structure was in a state of flux, likely due to the new players enter-
ing the market.325  While retailers like Starbucks still charged access 
fees, McDonald’s and retailers like it provided an hour of free access 
with the purchase of certain meals.326  Other providers also sought to 
enter the market and provide Wi-Fi access to consumers for free, hop-
ing to monetize access to these users by selling advertisements.327  At 
least some of these providers saw themselves in direct competition 
with the older market participants, like Starbucks.328  The approach 
seemed to be working and, by mid-2003, both the technology and fi-
nance sectors had doubts about the ability to capitalize Wi-Fi hotspots, 
some cautioning that the industry would do well to remember the pit-
falls of the then recent dot-com crash.329 
It seemed the tipping point for free Wi-Fi access arrived in 2004.  
News media continued to publish stories highlighting the increasing 
proliferation of Wi-Fi networks, while simultaneously casting doubts 
that models requiring payment for access were sustainable.330  The 
media portrayed the payment model as facing stiff competition from 
those providing free Wi-Fi, both intentionally331 and accidently.332  
Small businesses proclaimed they would use free Wi-Fi access as a loss-
leader to draw in business—sometimes evoking Starbucks directly in 
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comparison.333  However, by 2005, a report by JiWire, Inc. seemed to 
dampen those projections, noting that of the 34,544 Wi-Fi hotspots 
listed, only ten percent were free, while Starbucks and McDonald’s 
maintained about half of those hotspots.334 
The competition between price structures has not yet subsided 
despite the frequent shifting in the market, both in terms of who the 
providers are and what share of the market they captured.  In 2008, 
one of the largest providers of Wi-Fi access, AT&T, moved to allow 
free unlimited access at any of its hotspots—provided the customer 
purchased home high speed Internet first.335  Shortly thereafter, 
AT&T partnered with Starbucks to service its Wi-Fi and offered two 
free hours of access, then a first for Starbucks.336  This move did not 
prevent small local coffee shops, large chains like Panera, and even 
fast food restaurants like Schlotzky’s Deli from providing free Wi-Fi 
access as an attempt to woo visitors from Starbucks.337  Interestingly, 
soon after partnering with AT&T, Starbucks announced it would at-
tempt to fuse both price structures by granting limited free access to 
customers who used a loyalty card at least once per month.338  USA To-
day noted that Starbucks rolled the program out during “the worst 
slump in its history” and likely did so in an attempt to draw customers 
and profits.339 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that independent coffee shop own-
ers, at least those in New York City, are starting to reverse course and 
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remove free Wi-Fi due to a tightening economy and increased costs.340  
Further evidence suggests that smaller owners do not see their cus-
tomer base becoming disillusioned with these developments, seem-
ingly believing that focusing on locality and small businesses will keep 
their customers spending.341  It seems their theory will soon be put to 
the test since, in 2010, Starbucks announced it would be removing all 
pay mechanisms from its Wi-Fi access to allow unrestricted free ac-
cess.342 
Despite nearly ten years of technological development and con-
sumer demand, no clear consensus on Wi-Fi pricing structure exists.  
While it would seem that customers would vastly prefer free Wi-Fi ra-
ther than have it tacked on as an extra charge of staying in a hotel 
room, for example, consumers are apparently willing to pay for Wi-Fi 
as a matter of convenience.  Despite being a pioneer of commercial 
Wi-Fi application, Starbucks resisted the movement to free Wi-Fi until 
2010, when it suddenly reversed its policy.  Meanwhile, small busi-
nesses seem to now be eschewing free Wi-Fi in the hopes of lowering 
their costs, hoping that their supporters will stay loyal anyway.  As to 
how this impacts consumer expectations, consumers may not be sure 
what the pricing structure will be and where they will receive free ac-
cess.343  From these lessons, we turn next to the larger doctrinal and 
theoretical implications of cyber commodification. 
V.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF CYBER COMMODIFICATION 
To this point, this Article has focused on elaborating various fac-
ets of the concept of cyber commodification: how cyber commodifica-
tion differs from other forms, the forces propelling cyber commodifi-
cation, the process by which it takes place, and the contests that have 
arisen over this topic.  In each of these Parts, I have provided exam-
ples of how different aspects of monetization or non-monetization—
predicting it, policing it, advocating for one situation or another—
have been fairly confounding.  In this Part, I extrapolate several larger 
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theoretical points that can be drawn from the examples that I have 
spun out. 
First, it is of note that the issues surrounding cyber commodifica-
tion are similar in some respects to the debate in intellectual property 
(“IP”) law about creating proper incentives for creators by protecting 
IP rights while at the same time allowing for experimentation, parody, 
fair use, and open access.  This central conflict is played out in many 
of the debates over open access material versus the incentive to copy-
right.344  Similar argumentative tropes might be applicable in the con-
text of cyber commodification.  The problem, however, is slightly dif-
ferent, as the value generated from various collaborative activities 
comes from the wisdom of the crowd and the aggregation of talents 
and opinions, rather than the work of an individual creator seeking 
intellectual property protection for a personal invention.345 
Second, rather than looking at the issue in cold or impersonal 
market rhetoric, it is important to recognize commodification as a 
more human sociological issue.  As noted by Viviana Zelizer in The So-
cial Meaning of Money, “[w]hile money does serve as a key rational tool 
of the modern economic market, it also exists outside the sphere of 
the market and is profoundly influenced by cultural and social struc-
tures.”346  In her book, Collateral Knowledge, Professor Annelise Riles 
provides further anthropological insights into the social construction 
of markets.347  Professor Riles argues persuasively that market compo-
nents, such as the notion of collateral, may function as substitutes for 
personal knowledge of the counterparty to a transaction or elaborate 
dispute resolution mechanisms.348  These insights are important to 
understanding another point raised by Professor Zelizer: 
 Clearly, a link is missing in the traditional approach to 
money.  Impressed by the fungible, impersonal characteris-
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tics of money, classic theorists emphasized its instrumental 
rationality and apparently unlimited capacity to transform 
products, relationships, and sometimes even emotions into 
an abstract and objective numerical equivalent.  But money 
is neither culturally neutral nor socially anonymous.  It may 
well “corrupt” values and convert social ties into numbers, 
but values and social relations reciprocally transmute money 
by investing it with meaning and social patterns.349 
In other words, some of the cyber-exchanges I discuss in this Article 
may help us make sense of the larger web of collaborative knowledge 
that better communication and technology have made possible.  With 
these observations, I turn now to examine some thoughts about cyber 
commodification, first on the doctrinal level of contract law, and then 
on a broader macro level. 
A.  Doctrinal Implications of Cyber Commodification for Contract Law 
As for some of the legal disputes about commodification raised 
in earlier parts of the Article, we may want to look to well-known doc-
trines of contract law to help us resolve many of these questions.  Ear-
lier, I discussed the fact that some services, such as mapping programs 
and social networking, may allow users free access, but then dictate 
particular terms of use through adhesive end-user license agreements 
that no one reads.  Also, there are situations, such as the Huffington 
Post example, where clashing notions of whether the relationship was 
or should be commodified have caused conflict.  Some virtual activity 
is obviously paid work, but other types blur the lines between work 
and leisure.  This permeable boundary leads to conflicting expecta-
tions and therefore disputes. 
The traditional doctrines of contract law may be useful in analyz-
ing these varied situations.  The ancient doctrine of consideration, 
which I alluded to previously, may provide one mode of analysis.  We 
would ask here whether a bargained-for exchange exists between web-
sites and users.350  In many instances, a website might be providing us-
ers with valuable services but they may not receive anything directly in 
return from the users.  On the one hand, in a peer production model 
in which the user does not pay to use the platform, it might at first 
seem that there is no consideration and therefore no binding con-
tract.  On the other hand, the website is gaining control of the con-
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tent that a person is posting, and that content is extremely valuable, 
since it serves to build the value of the site and to attract other users.  
The power of many of these websites comes from the crowd and the 
ability to attract others to use the service.  Further, if a website is gath-
ering information about its users so that it can have information for 
advertisers or use that information in other ways, that action might 
qualify as receiving something tangibly valuable for consideration 
purposes under existing caselaw.351 
Other contractual rubrics may also be helpful for resolving dis-
putes.  One such possibility would be the doctrine of good faith and 
fair dealing; another would be unjust enrichment.  While not strictly 
contractual, unjust enrichment theories focus on a quantum meruit or 
restitutionary measure of recovery when one party has unjustly en-
riched another and no contract is present.352  The doctrine recognizes 
that, technically, assent is missing and contractual bargaining has 
been defective but, nonetheless, unfairness has occurred and one par-
ty has been enriched.353  In other words, many cases in this area dis-
cuss the “hypothetical bargain” model, that is, what would the parties 
have decided if they could turn back time and we could assume that 
they behaved in a rational way toward each other?  Even though the 
Huffington Post bloggers lost this argument, one assumes that the 
founders of the Huffington Post would have rather had the content 
from the bloggers, even if they would retroactively have to consider 
paying them, and that the bloggers may well have assented under 
those circumstances. 
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For the future, an important issue will be to determine who is 
participating in crowdsourcing websites or other virtual work for fun 
and in some unpaid capacity and those who are opting to work in the 
market economy, perhaps in a lower-skilled capacity, and thus argua-
bly should receive the traditional legal protections for employment 
activity.  As an example of the first category, we might think about 
unpaid editors and writers of Wikipedia who volunteer their time; and 
as an example of the second, clickworkers working on a crowdsourc-
ing website performing low-skilled tasks.  Under current law and prac-
tice, however, the distinction between these two categories has been 
an uncertain and difficult determination.  In fact, in earlier work I 
discussed this matter in some depth.354 
At the moment, there is little regulation and instead this area has 
been left to the realm of voluntary, contractual private ordering.  As-
suming that contract and voluntary agreements will remain of primary 
importance in determining the commodified or non-commodified 
nature of these relationships, the operative question would be what 
the best default rule would be: payment in the market or the assump-
tion that these are free activities performed on a volunteer basis.  If 
the majority of users participate on a website just for fun, that might 
weigh in favor of the default rule being no regulation, with an opt-in 
to the protections of labor and employment law.  In contrast, one 
could argue that the default rule should be protection and then users 
must deliberately and unequivocally state they are volunteers, 
acknowledge that they will not receive monetary payment, and clearly 
opt out.  As I have stated in previous work, I believe that the later ap-
proach—requiring an extremely clear opt out—is the better ap-
proach.  Considering the differential bargaining power often at issue 
in employment situations—which is why certain legal protections ex-
ist—it may make more sense to create a default rule of regulation, 
with clear assent needed in order to disclaim the protections. 
How to implement such consent, however, presents its own set of 
problems.  Many would suggest that clickwrap agreements would pro-
vide users with the information they need in order to know what kind 
of relationship they are getting into.  All Internet users are fairly fa-
miliar with such clickwrap agreements, as users must necessarily see 
and agree to clickwraps in order to use many websites, receive free 
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downloads, or order products.355  Clickwraps, however, have serious 
problems and have been subject to a withering critique.356  Commen-
tators have noted that clickwraps incorporate some of the worst char-
acteristics of adhesion contracts,357 allowing for “acceptance” or “re-
jection” of the terms as a whole only on a take it or leave it basis.358  
Many of the boilerplate terms contained in online agreements are of-
ten harsh, some so much so that they may be unconscionable.359  
There thus is a real concern that these types of “agreements” may not 
embody a worker’s true assent, or represent any kind of an informed 
decision about the terms.  This may not be the type of “assent” or 
“agreement” that is needed in order to inform workers of their rights, 
especially since workers tend not to understand many of the basic 
rights and responsibilities governing the employment relationship in 
any case.360 
In the employment realm, contractual ordering is somewhat dif-
ficult in part because the minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act (“FLSA”),361 is an immutable default rule—normally it cannot 
be waived, by clickwrap or other contract.  After all, if employers and 
employees could simply opt out of the minimum wage, the law would 
cease to have any meaning.  Companies might choose to exploit such 
an exemption opportunistically, not just to apply to those who partic-
ipate as volunteers and for entertainment.   
 Given the problematic nature of private ordering by contract, 
might some other solution be found?  As I have argued elsewhere, 
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there are several factors that should be given a prominent role in any 
determination of whether online activity is “work” and subject to regu-
lation under FLSA.  One factor to consider would be the question of 
whether the activity is considered paid work in other context.  If that 
is the case, perhaps commodification is an indication that the market 
activity that goes on there should properly be classified as paid work.  
Another factor might be whether the work is “de-skilled” work.  In 
such situations, the potential for exploitation might be higher, and 
thus the protections of the FLSA might be more important. 
 Finally, since the Department of Labor may choose to regulate 
this activity in the future, it might make sense for private employers 
that are experimenting with this type of work—and the websites that 
facilitate them—to attempt a voluntary effort in order to frame the 
dialogue if in fact an extension of the FLSA is proposed, which seems 
likely.  One such response might be to construct a code of “best prac-
tices” for cyberwork that attempts to draw some of the lines between 
work and entertainment activity, and set out some guidelines that 
would prevent the more extreme forms of exploitation.  These “best 
practices” would be influential if they formed a core set of expecta-
tions to which both workers and employers could adhere.  If such a 
voluntary response is present, the line-drawing exercise necessitated 
by the FLSA may not be as difficult as it might first appear. 
B.  Theoretical Implications of Cyber Commodification 
From these practical solutions, I now turn to a more theoretical 
discussion of cyber commodification.  It is important to note that 
cyber commodification has become a controversial area because 
group knowledge has particular characteristics that make it unique.  
After all, what do crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, prediction markets, 
and Wikipedia all have in common?  They all rely on, indeed could 
not exist without, the contributions of a large group of members.  
That is what is so interesting about these new businesses, the ones that 
harness the Internet successfully in a multitude of ways.  What is 
common between crowdsourcing and prediction markets is that both 
acknowledge that large groups, when properly harnessed, can result 
in better outcomes than the efforts of individuals. 362 
                                                        
 362.  See supra Parts II.B.1, IV.A (discussing crowdsourcing and prediction markets); see 
also CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 3–5 (2006) (dis-
cussing uses of crowdsourcing and prediction markets in public institutions and noting 
that “[c]ollaborative projects, often involving numerous strangers, are growing in both 
scale and quality, to the benefit of millions of people”). 
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These various websites, programs, and crowdsourcing tools are 
only valuable because of their scale.363  For example, Facebook is at its 
most useful when a person attains a critical mass of friends or ac-
quaintances who are also using it.  If a person has zero Facebook 
friends, being on Facebook will not be enjoyable, since there will be 
no one to read or “like” any posts.  In other words, the intrinsic value 
of the Facebook site to the individual person depends on how many 
others in their social circle are also using it.364  And the connections—
the fun part of being on Facebook—also generate value for the com-
pany itself, which can brag to advertisers about the number of con-
nections generated and the captive eyeballs on its platform.365  Like 
Facebook, so too Wikipedia, craigslist, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 
and countless other websites that are either commercial, or not, de-
pend on vast numbers of eyeballs and users.  In other words, the sites 
depend on harnessing the collective knowledge, skills, and time of 
their user base.366 
In examining these questions, I am largely interested in two legal 
theorists, Professors Margaret Jane Radin and Yochai Benkler, whose 
works inform and provide structure for the present context.  Professor 
Radin introduced and developed the theory of commodification in 
legal studies in a series of pathbreaking works concerning the com-
modification of the body and sexuality.367  For some years, Professor 
Benkler has been writing about open source computing and how 
networked peer production would seem to provide a “third way” of 
non-commodified production, apart from either markets or the firm, 
to borrow the terminology from Coase’s theory of the firm.368 
                                                        
 363.  See Teppo Felin & Todd R. Zenjer, Information Aggregation, Matching and Radical 
Market-Hierarchy Hybrids: Implications for the Theory of the Firm, 9 STRATEGIC ORG. 163, 163–
64, 166 (2011) (noting that both crowdsourcing websites and prediction markets harness 
the power of the crowd and also perform information aggregating and matching func-
tions). 
 364.  See Hetcher, supra note 49, at 995 (“[T]he more people who are on Facebook, the 
more it is in one’s interest to be on Facebook.”). 
 365.  See, e.g., John Cassidy, Me Media, NEW YORKER, May 15, 2006, at 50 (describing the 
lucrative advertising opportunities on Facebook and the idea that the more views a site 
has, the greater the revenue it will generate). 
 366.  See Jenny Preece, Sociability and Usability in Online Communities: Determining and 
Measuring Success, 20 BEHAV. & TECH. 347, 347–48, 51 (2001) (discussing how the number 
of participants and their contributions determine the success of online communities). 
 367.  See supra note 51 (listing several of Professor Radin’s works). 
 368.  See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 199, at 372 (discussing Coase’s theory of the firm). 
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In Contested Commodities, Professor Radin is concerned with how 
commodification interacts and perhaps subtracts from what she terms 
the “conception of personhood.”369  Aside from the theoretical con-
cept of commodification, which she explores in depth, she is also 
concerned with subordination, objectification, and the inequitable 
distribution of wealth within society.370  In fact, one question she raises 
is whether these other ills are the real concern, not commodification 
itself.371  Professor Radin does not espouse either one of these duali-
ties precisely and she mostly concentrates on commodification as it 
interacts with the sale of the body and related elements.372  As such, 
she focuses not so much on the dichotomy between commodification 
and non-commodification but with the concept of human flourish-
ing.373 
Although Professor Radin declares that she does not believe in 
setting up a binary opposition between “universal commodification” 
and complete “non-commodification,” she hints at various points 
throughout the book that commodification is dangerous.374  Although 
Professor Radin formally claims that she believes in discourse plural-
ism, the more examples she provides, the more the reader becomes 
convinced that commodification is a problem.  In her view, we are on 
a slippery slope of commodification that will chip away at our dignity, 
and ultimately our personhood as we slip our way down the slope.375  
She holds this view despite the fact that much of “woman’s work” has 
been undervalued precisely because it is outside the realm of the 
marketplace. 
In his book, The Wealth of Networks,376 and an accompanying law 
review article,377 Professor Yochai Benkler focuses on the potential for 
collaborative work in cyberspace.378  In both pieces, Professor Benkler 
                                                        
 369.  MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 154–55 (1996). 
 370.  Id. at 154–59. 
 371.  Id. at 155. 
 372.  Id. at 131–36. 
 373.  Id. at 79–80. 
 374.  See, e.g., id. at 79–80 (noting that some commentators have “maintained that 
commodification is inimical to the flourishing of human beings”); id. at 94 (“If commodi-
fication is bad in itself, it is bad for everything.”). 
 375.  Id. at 95–96. 
 376.  BENKLER, supra note 47. 
 377.  Benkler, supra note 199, at 372–76. 
 378.  See, e.g. BENKLER, supra note 47, at 9.  Professor Benkler argues:  
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regales the reader with rich descriptions of the Linux operating sys-
tem, Wikipedia, Project Gutenberg, and the NASA Mars project.379  In 
all of these online endeavors, users coordinate their efforts through 
collaboration by using small segments of their time, talents, or com-
puting power.  In Benkler’s vision, this “peer production” model pre-
sents another option for economic coordination (in addition to 
Coase’s description of markets and firms) when certain conditions are 
met.380  Throughout the book and the law review article, it is no secret 
that Professor Benkler strongly advocates for the importance of the 
peer production model.  According to Professor Benkler, money does 
not (and moreover should not) play into the motivations of the par-
ticipants.381  Rather, he claims, users are motivated by intellectual joy, 
pride, excellence, giving back to the community, and other similar 
non-monetary interests.382  While Professor Benkler mostly assumes 
that the users’ interests and those of the creators match, he does oc-
casionally allude to the idea of moral hazard. 
In Professor Benkler’s view, peer production stands the best 
chance of succeeding when the model is able to take into account the 
differing interests, talents, and capabilities of the users.383  He suggests 
that projects allowing users to harness their talents and match them 
with available tasks will be the most efficient for the peer production 
                                                        
As collaboration among far-flung individuals becomes more common, the idea 
of doing things that require cooperation with others becomes much more at-
tainable, and the range of projects individuals can choose as their own therefore 
qualitatively increases.  The very fluidity and low commitment required of any 
given cooperative relationship increases the range and diversity of cooperative 
relations people can enter, and therefore of collaborative projects they can con-
ceive of as open to them. 
Id. 
 379.  Benkler, supra note 199, at 371–72, 384, 386, 398.   
 380.  See id. at 404–06 (discussing peer production as an “important mode of infor-
mation production”). 
 381.  See id. at 372 (“But the critical mass of participation in projects cannot be ex-
plained by the direct presence of a command, a price, or even a future monetary re-
turn . . . .”). 
 382.  See, e.g., id. at 392–93 (discussing the Open Directory Project, and noting that vol-
unteers “manage the directory out of the joy of doing so or for other internal or external 
motivations”). 
 383.  See id. at 379 (noting that peer production will thrive where, among other things, 
“production [is] incremental and asynchronous, pooling the efforts of different people, 
with different capabilities, who are available at different times”). 
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model.384  Professor Benkler identifies two additional criteria for suc-
cessful peer production: granularity, which will allow for only a small 
task and a small commitment of time or effort and, second, modulari-
ty, which allows for those discrete elements to be successfully broken 
down and then later integrated into the larger project.385  While Pro-
fessors Radin and Benkler approach the problem quite differently—
Radin from a feminist perspective, Benkler from an open source ad-
vocacy perspective—both seem to view commodification with suspi-
cion. 
No theory to date explains why harnessing collective knowledge 
in cyberspace results in the presence of Wikipedia and, simultaneous-
ly, prediction markets.  Both do aggregate knowledge, but one is ex-
plicitly free, relying solely on the goodwill of volunteer editors and a 
few donated dollars, while prediction markets are built around the 
central theme that money is the only element that matters.  How do 
we reconcile these conflicting models?  How do we recognize that 
bloggers may view their contributions differently in varying situations, 
and that they are unhappy when their expectations about monetiza-
tion are not met by the blog’s operators? 
Overall, Professors Radin and Benkler have made outstanding 
contributions to commodification theory but at the same time seem 
skeptical of monetizing information on the Internet.  While I under-
stand their suspicion, the world of cyber commodification is so diverse 
that a rule of absolute non-commodification would do at least some of 
these new forms of collaboration a disservice.  For example, payment 
is important in virtual work to prevent exploitation of workers, espe-
cially disenfranchised workers in developing countries.  A norm of 
non-commodification does not take the rather unique status of these 
workers into account.  Money also may help us attain more accurate 
results in prediction markets. 
What is it that markets do that perhaps other forms are not able 
to do?  Markets, after all, perform an allocation as well as a coordina-
tion function.  A market orders and organizes what otherwise would 
be random activity.  Money might incentivize people to reveal their 
knowledge.  Further, a living wage for work performed is important.  
Contrary to what Professors Radin and Benkler seem to advocate, 
money itself is not the problem in some of the scenarios set out in this 
                                                        
 384.  See id. at 376 (discussing the importance of efficiency of self-identifying tasks in 
peer production).  
 385.  Id. at 378–79. 
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Article.386  In fact, the lack of money for work on the Internet—
especially when it concerns the meager wages paid to workers in de-
veloping countries in a crowdsourcing scheme—can smack more of 
exploitation than free collaboration. 
One way to look at this is as a coordination problem.  As we know 
from Coase’s theory of the firm, both markets and firms are ways of 
efficiently organizing economic activity.387  So what motivates people 
in a non-commodified crowdsourcing situation?  The question of mo-
tivation is far more complicated than homos economius would have us 
believe.388  There is a complicated series of motivations that drive any 
one person, including a mixture of altruism and self-interest.  Fur-
ther, while certain tasks might be freely volunteered, other tasks are 
simply too boring, mundane, annoying, or time-intensive that people 
will not do them unless they are paid.389 
Despite the warnings from Professors Benkler and Radin about 
commodification, there are certain areas where we should not be 
worried about monetization, but instead worried about non-
monetization.  For example, failing to pay workers minimum wage 
online should not be praised as a new method of peer production—it 
should be viewed skeptically, in some instances even condemned in 
the event that it leads to exploitation.  Those who change the expec-
tations of users halfway through a relationship due to moral hazard 
and the lure of money should not have their own expectations re-
spected.  At the same time, participants in social entrepreneurship or 
a prediction market will likely benefit from having  monetary ex-
change as part of their freedom of expression.  There is no reason to 
fear these forms of exchanges just because they involve money.  Re-
turning to Professor Zelizer’s point, money may influence society, but 
society influences money as well.390  Perhaps through efforts such as 
social entrepreneurship, we can change the way we think about the 
very concept of monetization. 
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Therefore, I would suggest that, unlike the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s conclusion, we do not have to choose between the wholly 
monetized model of eBay and the public-service world of craigslist.  
Instead of imposing choices, dichotomies, and artificial categories to 
these new forms of collaboration and business organization, we 
should allow entrepreneurs, social or otherwise, the freedom to ex-
periment, explore, and choose different models.  This freedom 
means, however, that websites should be free not only to implement a 
philanthropic or social business model, but also to use money to mo-
tivate their participants, such as in virtual work or within prediction 
markets.  But, when doing so, we must keep in mind Professor Radin’s 
particular admonition: will any particular activity in cyberspace add in 
total to the sum of human flourishing?391 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, our journey across the Internet shows us that cyber-
space is in a state of incomplete commodification.  The current land-
scape of cyberspace contains multiple regimes of commodified, non-
commodified, and mixed-use settings.  This mixture—which in many 
instances defies logic or common sense—tells us that there is no one 
natural “state of nature” for the Internet.  If anything, the develop-
ment of certain intermediate business models, such as social entre-
preneurship, can potentially reframe the ways that we look at the na-
ture of markets and the theory of the firm. 
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